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GINA, Big Data, and the Future of Employee Privacy 
abstract.  Threats to privacy abound in modern society, but individuals currently enjoy little 
meaningful legal protection for their privacy interests. We argue that the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) offers a blueprint for preventing employers from breaching em-
ployee privacy. GINA has faced signiﬁcant criticism since its enactment in 2008: commentators 
have dismissed the law as ill-conceived, unnecessary, and ineffective. While we concede that GINA 
may have failed to alleviate anxieties about medical genetic testing, we assert that it has unappre-
ciated value as an employee-privacy statute. In the era of big data, protections for employee privacy 
are more pressing than protections against genetic discrimination. Instead of failed legislation, 
GINA could represent the future of employment law. 
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introduction 
Workers of the future may enjoy little to no privacy on the job. A recent ar-
ticle in the Economist describes Humanyze, a data-analytics ﬁrm that is using its 
algorithmic approach to human resources on its own employees.
1
 Workers at 
Humanyze wear identiﬁcation badges that monitor their every move. The de-
vices include microphones that pick up conversations, Bluetooth and infrared 
sensors that track location, and an accelerometer that records movement.
2
 That 
data is cross-referenced with employees’ calendars, emails, and other personal 
information.
3
 The reports generated from this data include a surprisingly inti-
mate amount of detail, including how much time an employee spends with 
members of the same sex, her level of physical activity, and the amount of time 
she spends speaking versus listening.
4
 
The head of Humanyze sees these practices as smart business. He explains, 
“[e]very aspect of business is becoming more data-driven. There’s no reason the 
people side of business shouldn’t be the same.”
5
 However, employees may not 
share that sentiment. One employee of the software ﬁrm Workday, which also 
offers predictive data, quipped, “[t]his company knows much more about me 
than my family does.”
6
 This sentiment is increasingly common among workers. 
A recent study in the United Kingdom revealed that most respondents believed 
that their bosses were spying on them, and two-thirds thought that the increas-




Stories like these give people more reason to be concerned with their privacy 
than ever before. New technology, sometimes called “big data,” offers the op-
portunity to aggregate and cross-reference information to gain access to some of 
our most intimate secrets, including our disease risks, our reproductive choices, 
 
1. See There Will Be Little Privacy in the Workplace of the Future, ECONOMIST (Mar. 28, 2018) 
[hereinafter There Will Be Little Privacy], https://www.economist.com/special-report
/2018/03/28/there-will-be-little-privacy-in-the-workplace-of-the-future [https://perma.cc
/343W-P69Y]. 
2. See id. 
3. See id. 
4. See id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Ben Chapman, More than Half of Employees Believe Their Boss Is Spying on Them at Work, IN-
DEPENDENT (Aug. 17, 2018, 9:15 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news
/workplace-surveillance-employees-boss-spying-on-workers-tuc-survey-a8495651.html 
[https://perma.cc/KV6R-S3D4]. 
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and information regarding our personal relationships. Employers might be par-
ticularly interested in snooping into their employees’ private lives. Data analytics 
could reveal which employees are more likely to get sick, which employees are 
more likely to take parental leave, and which employees are more likely to be 
under stress at home. At present, the law offers few legal protections against this 
kind of prying. We propose that the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
(GINA),
8
 an idiosyncratic federal antidiscrimination law, might provide an un-
expected pathway for navigating the growing challenges presented by big data. 
In this Feature, we argue that one decade after its passage, GINA, which 
Congress intended primarily as a safeguard against discrimination based on ge-
netic-test results, is better understood as a much-needed protection for em-
ployee privacy. In so arguing, we offer three novel contributions. First, we pro-
vide an empirical account of all the available cases decided under GINA. 
Systematically examining all the cases and quantifying both the recurring factual 
scenarios and the legal issues that have arisen in GINA’s ﬁrst decade allows us to 
say exactly what the statute is—and is not—accomplishing in the courts. 
Second, we use that original case research to establish that in GINA’s ﬁrst 
ten years, there have been no successful claims ﬁled for discrimination based on 
genetic-test results. Instead, most of the successful cases under GINA have in-
volved impermissible requests for protected data. GINA, in practical terms, has 
functioned more as a protection against invasions of privacy than as a protection 
against discrimination. 
While GINA’s role as a privacy law is unexpected, it could hardly be better 
timed. The genetic-testing market has ballooned in recent years because of the 
FDA’s increasing openness to genetic tests that allow consumers to screen their 
genes for disease risk from the convenience of their own homes. For example, in 
2018 the FDA approved the ﬁrst direct-to-consumer DNA test for three 
BRCA1/BRCA2 genetic mutations, each of which sharply increases the risk of 
breast cancer.
9
 Meanwhile, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) aims to en-
roll a million people by 2019 in its Precision Medicine Initiative,
10
 a research ef-
fort intended to tailor the delivery of health care to a patient’s speciﬁc genetic 
 
8. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (cod-
iﬁed as amended in scattered sections of 29 & 42 U.S.C.). 
9. See FDA Authorizes, with Special Controls, Direct-to-Consumer Test that Reports Three Mutations 
in the BRCA Breast Cancer Genes, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.fda
.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm599560.htm [https://perma.cc
/ZNB9-UYDS]. 
10. Precision Medicine Initiative Working Grp., The Precision Medicine Initiative Cohort Program – 
Building a Research Foundation for 21st Century Medicine, NAT’L INST. HEALTH 2 (Sept. 17, 2015), 
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makeup and disease proﬁle.
11
 And private DNA ancestry databases made head-
lines in 2018, when law enforcement used that technology to solve a string of 
decades-old murders.
12
 Careful thinking about genetic privacy is now more crit-
ical than ever. 
Third, we argue that GINA’s role as a privacy statute highlights the need for 
greater employee-privacy measures in general. In particular, GINA’s statutory 
design might well function as a blueprint for additional employment protec-
tions. GINA provides an important case study for safeguarding sensitive em-
ployee information that could be extended to a whole host of other areas, such 
as social media proﬁles, browser searches, and ﬁtness-tracking data. 
We tell the story of GINA in three acts. Part I introduces the statute and ex-
plains what legislators designed GINA to accomplish. Part II examines the ﬁrst 
decade of GINA. We begin with our case-study ﬁndings. Next, we turn to the 
common misreading of GINA as a failure based on its performance in the courts. 
We argue that the cases decided and settlements reached reveal that GINA is 
hitting its stride as a privacy statute. Finally, Part III argues that genetic privacy—
and privacy in ancillary ﬁelds—is more important than ever before and that 
GINA is precisely the kind of protection we need in an age of big data and in-
creasingly invasive technologies. Moreover, GINA provides a conceptual blue-
print for protecting employees from discrimination in a variety of other areas. 
GINA’s ﬁrst ten years reveal that it may be a prototype for future antidiscrimi-
nation laws. 
i .  gina in theory 
Congress did not design GINA as a broad employee-privacy statute. Rather, 




11. See Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Precision Medicine Initiative, WHITE 
HOUSE (Jan. 30, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/30
/fact-sheet-president-obama-s-precision-medicine-initiative [https://perma.cc/R3TC 
-LQJH]. 
12. See Abigail Abrams, How Did They Catch the Golden State Killer? An Online DNA Service and 
His Genetic Relatives Revealed the Suspect, TIME (Apr. 26, 2018), http://time.com/5256835
/how-did-golden-state-killer-genealogy-websites-online-dna-police [https://perma.cc
/9AE9-DMPK]; Jessica L. Roberts, Opinion, A Houston DNA Company Helped Catch the 
Golden State Killer. What Does It Mean for Your Privacy?, HOUS. CHRON. (May 17, 2018), 
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/outlook/article/A-Houston-DNA-company 
-helped-catch-the-Golden-12920214.php [https://perma.cc/H3AW-9NZK]. 
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new form of discrimination before it started.
13
 Discrimination based on genetic 
information was not a widespread social problem when Congress passed GINA. 
But supporters hoped that GINA might encourage genetic testing by giving peo-
ple peace of mind about their genetic information. Indeed, Congress crafted the 
law to deal with the speciﬁc risks related to health insurance and employment 
that could discourage people from seeking genetic testing altogether. This Part 
introduces GINA’s statutory protections and places it in its historical context, 
explaining why Congress opted to pass an antidiscrimination statute absent a 
longstanding history of discrimination. 
A. A Brief Introduction to GINA 
Hailed as the ﬁrst civil rights law of the twenty-ﬁrst century, GINA protects 
against discrimination on the basis of genetic information. Congress designed 
the statute to alleviate people’s anxieties about genetic testing by prohibiting 
health insurers and employers from using genetic-test results and family medical 
history to discriminate. In this Section, we outline the contours of GINA’s pro-
tections, discussing the statute’s structure and its deﬁnitions of genetic infor-
mation and discrimination. 
The statute has two substantive titles. Title I contains the health-insurance 
provisions, which prevent insurers from requesting genetic information and 
from using that information in their underwriting and rating decisions. Title I 
amends several federal health-insurance statutes to close any gaps in those 
laws.
14
 Because GINA draws from existing legislation, it has no independent en-
forcement mechanisms for its health-insurance sections. Instead, it relies on the 
enforcement mechanisms of those underlying laws, most of which have no pri-
vate right of action.
15
 But Title II, which contains GINA’s employment provi-
 
13. See Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information Nondis-
crimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 470-71 (2010) (discussing legislative history that 
demonstrates Congress’s intent to address genetic-information discrimination even while ac-
knowledging it was not yet occurring widely). 
14. See id. at 452 (explaining that Title I, like the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 (HIPAA), amends preexisting insurance legislation); id. at 443-44 (identifying 
gaps in HIPAA’s coverage that Title I would later address). 
15. See Nat’l Human Genome Research Inst., “GINA”: The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act of 2008: Information for Researchers and Health Care Professionals, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUM. SERVICES (Apr. 6, 2009), https://www.genome.gov/pages/policyethics 
/geneticdiscrimination/ginainfodoc.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ALZ-F6RY] (discussing the en-
forcement of Title I of GINA by various agencies whose laws were amended by the statute, 
including the Department of Labor, Department of the Treasury, and Department of Health 
and Human Services). 
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sions, is its own standalone portion of the federal code with an independent pri-
vate right of action.
16
 
GINA deﬁnes statutorily protected genetic information as (1) a person’s ge-
netic tests, (2) the genetic tests of her family members, and (3) manifested con-
ditions in her family members.
17
 Pursuant to GINA’s Title II regulations, a per-
son’s family members are her dependents, regardless of whether through birth, 
marriage, or adoption, as well as her ﬁrst, second, third, and fourth degree rela-
tives.
18
 Congress included family medical history in the deﬁnition of genetic in-
formation because it understood that employers could use family medical history 
“as a surrogate for genetic traits.”
19





 or an individual’s own health conditions
22
 from its 
deﬁnition of genetic information. Finally, Title II of GINA prohibits employers 
and other employment-related entities like unions, agencies, and training pro-
grams from discriminating on the basis of genetic information. Instead of deﬁn-
ing employer, GINA adopts the deﬁnitions of employer found in Title VII of the 




Importantly, GINA’s text includes no element of genetic risk. In other words, 
nothing in the deﬁnition of genetic information requires the covered data to 
speak to a person’s propensity for developing a particular health condition. In-
deed, as GINA was being debated, some legislators lamented that the deﬁnition 
of genetic information was too broad and argued it should cover only predictive 
information.
24
 Still, the language of the bill was not amended, leaving GINA 
 
16. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 207, 42 U.S.C. 2000ff-6 (2018). 
17. Id. § 201(4)(A)(i)-(iii). 
18. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(a)(2) (2018). The statute deﬁnes each of these relational degrees: 
(i) First-degree relatives include an individual’s parents, siblings, and children. 
(ii) Second-degree relatives include an individual’s grandparents, grandchildren, 
uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, and half-siblings. (iii) Third-degree relatives in-
clude an individual’s great-grandparents, great-grandchildren, great uncles/aunts, 
and ﬁrst cousins. (iv) Fourth-degree relatives include an individual’s great-great-
grandparents, great-great-grandchildren, and ﬁrst cousins once-removed (i.e., the 
children of the individual’s ﬁrst cousins). 
Id. 
19. H.R. REP. NO. 110-28, pt. 1, at 36 (2007). 
20. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 201(4)(C). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. § 210. 
23. Id. § 201(2)(B). 
24. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-28, pt. 3, at 69-71. 




 Thus, on its face, GINA would appear to cover all 
genetic-test results—including DNA forensics
26
 and DNA ancestry tests
27
—as 
well as all manifested conditions in family members, regardless of whether those 
conditions are genetic in nature. In addition to its more traditional antidiscrim-
ination protections, GINA’s health-insurance and employment provisions both 
prohibit requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information. Hence, to vi-
olate GINA, a health insurer or employer need not even receive—let alone act 
on—genetic information. The covered entity merely needs to ask. In this way, 
GINA uses privacy as a bulwark, preventing access to the very information health 
insurers or employers could use to discriminate.
28
 
B. GINA’s Purpose 
While outlawing conduct that is not yet occurring may seem like a waste of 
legislative energy, Congress was responding to a unique set of social and histor-
ical factors when it passed GINA. The statute was, in fact, a long time coming. 
In this Section, we provide the historical background for GINA, outline Con-
gress’s intent, and take a deeper dive into the statute’s protections. 
1. Background Information 
Fully understanding GINA requires knowing about both the genetic-testing 
industry and the American health-insurance system. We begin with a brief in-
troduction to genetic science before turning to the characteristics of the health-
insurance industry that prompted Congress to act. 
 
25. Id. at 66 (complaining that Title II failed to take a cue from the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the 
“numerous exclusions for use and disclosure” in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)). 
26. See, e.g., Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Grp. Retail Servs. (Atlanta), LLC, 102 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1364 
(N.D. Ga. 2015) (ﬁnding that employer-conducted genetic testing for investigative purposes 
violates GINA). 
27. See Trina Jones et al., DNA-Based Race? 47-53 (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with au-
thors). 
28. See Bradley A. Areheart, GINA, Privacy, and Antisubordination, 46 GA. L. REV. 705, 710 (2012) 
(arguing that antidiscrimination principles are natural allies to privacy); Jessica L. Roberts, 
Protecting Privacy to Prevent Discrimination, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2097, 2099-2103 (2015) 
(arguing that privacy law can do the work of antidiscrimination law, and vice versa). 
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a. Rise of Genetic Information 
Members of Congress began introducing prophylactic genetic legislation in 
the early 1990s, around the time that scientists started sequencing the human 
genome.
29
 The possibility that genetic information could jeopardize health- 
insurance coverage was on everyone’s minds.
30
 By the time GINA passed in 
2008, almost every state had some kind of protection already on the books.
31
 The 
motivation for these laws, as well as for GINA, was not so much actual discrim-
ination or invasions of privacy, but hypothetical ones. 
Although genetic science has a variety of uses, ﬁrst and foremost it predicts 
disease risk.
32
 Genetic tests can tell people whether they have a heightened pro-
clivity for a host of hereditary conditions, from Alzheimer’s to Zellweger Syn-
drome. At the beginning of the genetic revolution, the technologies available to 
sequence genetic data were expensive and time-consuming. The Human Ge-
nome Project, in fact, took thirteen years to fully sequence a single human ge-
nome, at a cost of somewhere between ﬁve hundred million and one billion dol-
lars.
33
 Today, a high-quality whole-genome sequence can be generated for 




29. See Francis S. Collins, Shattuck Lecture—Medical and Societal Consequences of the Human Ge-
nome Project, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 28, 34 (1999); Karen Rothenberg et al., Genetic Information 
and the Workplace: Legislative Approaches and Policy Challenges, 275 SCIENCE 1755, 1756 (1997) 
(providing a discussion of federal legislation related to genetic information resulting from the 
efforts of the Working Group on Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of the Human Ge-
nome Research). 
30. See Mark A. Rothstein, Is GINA Worth the Wait?, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 174, 174 (“When the 
Human Genome Project officially began in 1990, the potential for genetic discrimination in 
health insurance was the ﬁrst issue to receive the attention of scholars, policy analysts, and 
state legislatures.”). 
31. See Roberts, supra note 13, at 446 n.27 (citing Genetics and Health Insurance State Anti-Discrim-
ination Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2008), http://www.ncsl.org/research
/health/genetic-nondiscrimination-in-health-insurance-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/QM2K
-ZQTY]). 
32. See, e.g., William S. Bush & Jason H. Moore, Chapter 11: Genome-Wide Association Studies, 
PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIO., Dec. 2012, at 1 (“The ultimate goal of GWAS is to use genetic 
risk factors to make predictions about who is at risk and to identify the biological underpin-
nings of disease susceptibility for developing new prevention and treatment strategies.”). 
33. The Cost of Sequencing a Human Genome, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (July 6, 2016), 
https://www.genome.gov/27565109/the-cost-of-sequencing-a-human-genome [https://
perma.cc/LU3P-LGDK]. 
34. Id.; see also Abigail Fagan, From 13 Years to 20 Hours, Genome Sequencing Breaks Record, GENOME 
MAG. (Mar. 1, 2018), http://genomemag.com/2018/03/from-13-years-to-20-hours-genome 
-sequencing-breaks-record [https://perma.cc/7BNC-BS6Q]. 
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b. The American Health-Insurance System 
American health care is some of the most expensive in the world,
35
 and nec-
essary medical treatment may be prohibitively expensive absent health-insur-
ance coverage. Thus, access to meaningful health insurance is often a proxy for 
access to health care. For some patients, losing health-insurance coverage can be 
a death sentence. 
Complicating things further, the United States does not have a uniform 
health-insurance system. Instead, it has a patchwork of public and private op-
tions that rely on various qualifying criteria. For example, the government covers 
its citizens at the beginning and the end of life: Medicaid covers almost half of 
all births each year,
36
 and Medicare provides coverage for the elderly.
37
 Other 
populations that enjoy government-sponsored health beneﬁts include veterans, 
people with disabilities, Native Americans, and low-income individuals.
38
  
Everyone else must obtain their health-insurance policies from private compa-
nies.
39
 Most working-age Americans with health insurance have employer-pro-
vided plans.
40




35. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Real Cost of the US Health Care System, 319 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 983, 983 
(2018). 
36. Vernon K. Smith et al., Implementing Coverage and Payment Initiatives: Results from a 50-State 
Medicaid Budget Survey for Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. 10 (Oct. 
2016), http://ﬁles.kff.org/attachment/Report-Implementing-Coverage-and-Payment 
-Initiatives [https://perma.cc/Q5GG-4SB3]. 
37. Who Is Eligible for Medicare?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (Sept. 11, 2014), https://
www.hhs.gov/answers/medicare-and-medicaid/who-is-elibible-for-medicare/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/S4U7-28XP]. 
38. See 25 U.S.C. § 1621 (2018) (Native Americans); 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2018) (disabled people); 42 
U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)(A)(i)(IV) (2018) (low-income families); 38 C.F.R. § 17.38 (2017) (vet-
erans). 
39. T.R. REID, THE HEALING OF AMERICA: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR BETTER, CHEAPER, AND FAIRER 
HEALTH CARE 20-21 (2009); cf. JESSICA C. BARNETT & MARINA S. VORNOVITSKY, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015, at 1-3 (2016), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-257
.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR7W-JWFA]. Even under the Affordable Care Act, the government 
has assembled private insurance companies to create health-insurance marketplaces that, in 
their ideal formulation, allow Americans to “one-stop shop for a health care plan, compare 
beneﬁts and prices, and choose the plan that’s best for them.” Barack Obama, Letter to Senate 
Democratic Leaders on Health Care Reform (June 2, 2009), https://www.govinfo.gov/content
/pkg/DCPD-200900432/pdf/DCPD-200900432.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3UD-3H9N]. 
40. See BARNETT & VORNOVITSKY, supra note 39, at 1. 
41. See id. 
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Private health insurance in the United States is primarily for-proﬁt. To make 
money, an insurance company must accurately assess risk to ensure that it is 
earning more in premiums than it is paying out in claims. Before Congress 
passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010, private insurance companies had 
signiﬁcantly more leeway regarding which policies they offered to whom and at 
what price. American health insurance, in other words, depended on risk rating. 
Particularly in the pre-ACA individual market, if a person seemed to be a 
“bad risk,” obtaining health insurance could be next to impossible. Consider the 
following hypothetical. A person with a cancer diagnosis wishes to purchase 
health insurance on the pre-ACA individual market. Given the high likelihood 
that she would require expensive treatment and drain the company coffers, a 
private, for-proﬁt health insurer could have done a few different things. First, it 
could have offered her a policy but not covered her cancer expenses. This tactic 
is known as a “preexisting condition exclusion.”
42
 Second, the insurer could have 
capped the coverage it was willing to pay for the cancer treatment, either annu-
ally or over the lifetime of the policy. For example, it might have covered the ﬁrst 
ten thousand dollars, but after that, the patient would have had to pay out of 
pocket. Third, the insurer could have offered the person a policy that provides 
comprehensive coverage for cancer but priced it at a very high rate. Such a policy 
would reﬂect the actual cost of cancer treatment, making it extremely expen-
sive—so expensive that it might be unaffordable. Finally, if the chances of turn-
ing a proﬁt were remote enough, the insurer might have deemed the person not 
worth insuring and refused to offer her a plan at all. 
People on employer-provided plans also faced their own set of challenges 
before the ACA. Even now, linking health insurance to employment means that 
losing a job can also mean losing health insurance. Fears of giving up beneﬁts 
and being left uninsured can lead people to stay in their current positions, a phe-
nomenon known as “job lock.”
43
 Also, the employer-provided system may en-
courage employers, particularly those offering small-group insurance, to employ 
only “good risks” to avoid hiking up their premiums or having to make big pay-
outs. Congress attempted to regulate what employers could do as de facto pro-
viders of health insurance through statutes like the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act (ERISA) and the Health Insurance Portability and 
 
42. DICTIONARY OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND MANAGED CARE 226 (David E. Marcinko ed., 2006). 
43. Dean Baker, Job Lock and Employer-Provided Health Insurance: Evidence from the Literature, 
AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. 1 (Mar. 2015), https://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/ppi/2015-03
/JobLock-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XSU-R8ZT]. 




 However, pre-GINA and pre-ACA, those laws 
still left employees vulnerable.
45
 
2. Congress’s Intent in Passing GINA 
Given the state of the American health-insurance system in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, fears of losing health insurance were justiﬁed. Discovering previ-
ously unknown health risks can make health care more difficult to access. Espe-
cially before the ACA, a quantiﬁable medical risk could mean higher premiums 
or losing coverage altogether. In the pre-GINA, pre-ACA era, health insurers 
could request genetic testing and engage in much more risk rating.
46
 Against this 
backdrop, the combination of predictive genetics and private, for-proﬁt health 
insurance created an ironic twist for medical genetic testing. If a person were 
tested and learned she was at a heightened risk, she might ﬁnd herself uninsur-
able and therefore unable to access treatment, including treatment for the very 
condition that prompted her to take the genetic test in the ﬁrst place. For exam-
ple, a woman with a family medical history of breast cancer might seek BRCA1 
testing. If her test revealed a genetic predisposition for breast cancer, her insurer 
might want to drop her. Losing coverage could jeopardize her ability to access 
care, either preventatively or if the cancer manifested. This fear was well under-
stood; GINA’s legislative history included stories of employees who tested pos-
itive for heightened genetic risk and were then asked to switch insurance policies 
to save their employers money.
47
 It is no wonder then that people hesitated to 
take genetic tests. Learning of a medical risk could put them, as well as their 
family members, at risk of losing access to health care. 
This rational decision on the part of consumers was bad news for the genetic-
testing industry. Investors banked on the belief that once the tests became faster 
 
44. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2018) (making it unlawful for an employer to interfere with rights pro-
vided to an employee by an employee beneﬁt plan); see also Baker, supra note 43, at 8 (describ-
ing the implementation of HIPAA as a way to minimize job lock). 
45. For example, while HIPAA outlawed charging an individual group member more for a pre-
mium, it did not prevent hiking the premium rate for the group as a whole. See Roberts, supra 
note 13, at 443; Dale Halsey Lea, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA): What 




46. Although HIPAA prohibits the use of genetic information in decisions about eligibility or pre-
miums, it does not prohibit requesting or requiring genetic information, nor does it apply to 
the individual health-insurance market. See Roberts, supra note 13, at 443-44. 
47. See id. at 466-67. 
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and more affordable, they would enjoy a signiﬁcant market.
48
 But when the sci-
ence improved and the projected increase did not occur, stakeholders wanted to 
know why.
49
 Not surprisingly, survey data reported that people were uncomfort-
able with genetic tests for a variety of reasons, especially because of concerns 
about employment discrimination and losing health insurance.
50
 
In passing GINA, Congress attempted to respond to this catch-22 by ensur-
ing that a heightened genetic risk would not mean losing a job or health insur-
ance. That reassurance might then encourage people to participate in medical 
genetic testing. If there is any doubt that Congress designed GINA to alleviate 
public concerns about taking medical genetic tests, lawmakers spoke their sub-
text. The last line of GINA’s congressional ﬁndings reads: “Federal legislation 
establishing a national and uniform basic standard is necessary to fully protect 
the public from discrimination and allay their concerns about the potential for 
discrimination, thereby allowing individuals to take advantage of genetic-test-
ing, technologies, research, and new therapies.”
51
 GINA thus represents a very 
speciﬁc response to a very speciﬁc problem. 
Putting GINA in its social and historical context reveals that while the statute 
appears to be simple, straightforward antidiscrimination legislation, its purpose 
differs signiﬁcantly from traditional civil rights legislation. Whereas those laws 
addressed existing social problems, GINA responded to anxieties about future 
social problems. Thus, the paradigmatic GINA claim seems to target a health 
 
48. See Rothstein, supra note 30, at 175 (“In addition, genetics researchers, biotech companies, 
pharmaceutical companies, and genetic test developers realize that their efforts will be for 
naught unless individuals are willing to undergo genetic testing. Thus, researchers and com-
mercial interests have been among the staunchest supporters of genetic nondiscrimination 
legislation.”). 
49. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 13, at 471-73 (describing people’s unwillingness to participate in 
research or to take genetic tests). 
50. See Mark A. Hall & Stephen S. Rich, Patients’ Fear of Genetic Discrimination by Health Insurers: 
The Impact of Legal Protections, 2 GENETICS MED. 214, 216 tbl.1 (2000) (showing that sixty-
seven percent of genetic counselors reported that patients had a high level of concern about 
genetic discrimination regarding adult-onset conditions when deciding to be tested); Roth-
stein, supra note 30, at 175 (“There is considerable evidence that numerous individuals who 
are genetically at-risk for some serious disorders decline potentially efficacious genetic testing 
and medical intervention because they are concerned about the possibility of discrimination 
against themselves and family members.”); see also Laura M. Amendola et al., Why Patients 
Decline Genomic Sequencing Studies: Experiences from the CSER Consortium, 2018 J. GENETIC 
COUNSELING 1220, 1225 (reporting that thirteen percent of patients declined genetic testing 
because of privacy and discrimination concerns). 
51. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 2, 122 Stat. 881, 
882-83. 
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insurer that either drops coverage or hikes up premiums based on a genetic test 
that reveals a previously unknown health risk. 
GINA’s other protections appear to grow out of this core concern. GINA co-
vers employment because of its connection to health insurance. And because we 
share so much genetic information with our family members—a reality thrown 
into sharp relief when authorities recently apprehended a killer based on the ge-
netic data of a family member
52
—individuals reasonably fear that their genetic-
test results could harm their loved ones. Pre-GINA, people reported avoiding 
genetic tests not because of anxieties surrounding their own health risks, but out 
of concerns for their families. In particular, they worried that their genetic-test 
results could cause their children to lose health-insurance coverage.
53
 GINA, 
therefore, covers the genetic test results of family members. Congress also in-
cluded family medical history—albeit not one’s own manifested conditions—be-
cause it is hard to distinguish meaningfully between getting ﬁred because your 
sister carries the BRCA1 gene and getting ﬁred because your sister has breast 
cancer. Lastly, the privacy protection bolsters the antidiscrimination protection. 
After all, a person cannot lose her policy based on information that the insurer 
cannot access. 
3. GINA’s Idiosyncratic Protections 
Considering Congress’s intent, GINA’s seemingly peculiar protections make 
sense. Four things make GINA different from other familiar federal antidiscrim-
ination statutes: (a) its limited scope; (b) its narrow protected status; (c) its 
prohibited conduct; and (d) its broad exceptions. 
a. Limited Scope 
Compared to other civil rights laws, which tend to cover discrimination 
across a wide swath of contexts, GINA is relatively limited in scope.
54
 For exam-
ple, the Civil Rights Act has titles that pertain to voting, public accommodations, 
 
52. See Roberts, supra note 12. 
53. See Roberts, supra note 13, at 472 & n.168; see also Rothstein, supra note 30, at 175 (“There is 
considerable evidence that numerous individuals who are genetically at-risk for some serious 
disorders decline potentially efficacious genetic testing and medical intervention because they 
are concerned about the possibility of discrimination against themselves and family mem-
bers.”). 
54. But see Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2(b), 
81 Stat. 602, 602 (codiﬁed as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2018)) (describing the ADEA’s 
purpose as the protection of older persons in employment). 
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government services, education, federal funding, and employment.
55
 Likewise, 
the ADA has titles governing employment, government services, and public ac-
commodations.
56
 By contrast, GINA applies only to health insurance and em-
ployment. GINA’s employment title provides that discrimination in health in-




From a practical perspective, GINA’s limited coverage means that a signiﬁ-
cant portion of genetic-privacy invasions and discrimination goes unregulated. 
In most states, for example, it is perfectly legal for banks, landlords, schools, and 
even life insurers to make decisions based on genetic information.
58
 However, 
given GINA’s very speciﬁc goal of encouraging more people to take medical ge-
netic tests, Congress’s decision to limit the statute’s scope to health insurance 
and employment was sensible. Health insurance and employment were the areas 
of greatest concern, and more expansive legislation would not have received ad-
equate congressional support. 
b. Narrow Protected Status 
GINA protects against very limited forms of discrimination, whereas other 
federal antidiscrimination laws contain broader protections.
59
 At present GINA 
only proscribes intentional discrimination. In fact, GINA explicitly excludes em-
 
55. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codiﬁed as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000a-2000f (2018)). 
56. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codiﬁed as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12132, 12182 (2018)). 
57. Roberts, supra note 13, at 450 (explaining that GINA includes a “ﬁrewall” provision, which 
prohibits claimants from suing under both the employment and health-insurance provisions 
to obtain separate remedies, to allay fears that employers providing insurance would get sued 
twice). 
58. California, which passed its own comprehensive state legislation called CalGINA, is the nota-
ble exception. See CalGINA, ch. 261, 2011 Cal. Stat. 2774 (codiﬁed in scattered sections of the 
California Codes). CalGINA covers the use of genetic information in health insurance, em-
ployment, housing, restrictive covenants, emergency medical care and services, and ﬁnancial 
institutions and amended the Education Code to provide schools more information needed 
to help combat genetic-information bias. Id. 
59. For example, courts have construed Title VII to apply to all races and sexes. Similarly, after 
the Amendments Act, the ADA has an intentionally broad construction. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101(b)(1) (“The purposes of this Act are to carry out the ADA’s objectives of providing ‘a 
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination’ and ‘clear, 
strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination’ by reinstating a broad 
scope of protection to be available under the ADA.”). 
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ployment discrimination actions for disparate impact.
60
 Disparate impact actions 
cover claims for discrimination by effect, not by design. For example, genes as-
sociated with height may also carry with them an increased risk of heart disease. 
Thus, a height requirement could also have a disparate impact on the basis of 
genetic information.
61
 Because GINA covers only explicit discrimination, em-
ployers could even attempt to use the lack of disparate impact coverage as an 
end-run around the statute, adopting policies designed to screen out people with 
certain genetic attributes.
62
 Congress included a provision establishing a com-
mission that would assemble six years from GINA’s enactment to assess the po-
tential need for a disparate impact protection.
63
 However, as of this writing, that 
commission has not convened. 
GINA also fails to require positive differential treatment, such as accommo-
dations.
64
 Genetic accommodations could allow employees to mitigate their ge-
netic risk. For instance, an employer might accommodate an employee with a 
genetic proclivity for carpal tunnel syndrome by having that employee work a 
longer shift but with more breaks.
65
 Commentators, including one of the authors 
of this Feature, have proposed that GINA could beneﬁt tremendously from al-
lowing employers to account for genetic difference.
66
 
Finally, while all people are potential beneﬁciaries of GINA because we all 
have genetic information, the law’s actual coverage is quite narrow. As noted, the 
legal deﬁnition of genetic information excludes sex, age, and manifested condi-
 
60. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 208(a), 42 U.S.C. §2000ff-7(a) (2018). 
The text expressly provides that there is no cause of action for unintentional practices that 
may have a disparate impact on the basis of genetic information. Id. (“Notwithstanding any 
other provision of this Act, ‘disparate impact’, as that term is used in section 703(k) of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . , on the basis of genetic information does not establish a cause of 
action under this Act.”). 
61. See Jessica L. Roberts, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an Antidiscrimination 
Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 639-40 (2011). 
62. Id. at 640. 
63. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 208(b). The Act provides: 
On the date that is 6 years after the date of enactment of this Act, there shall be 
established a commission, to be known as the Genetic Nondiscrimination Study 
Commission (referred to in this section as the ‘Commission’) to review the devel-
oping science of genetics and to make recommendations to Congress regarding 
whether to provide a disparate impact cause of action under this Act. 
Id. 
64. See Roberts, supra note 61, at 639. 
65. See id. 
66. See, e.g., id. at 638-39. 




 These omissions would confound any geneticist or genetic counselor 
who knows that chromosomes determine biological sex, that the telomeres pro-
tecting our genetic data shorten as we age, and that the line between a genetic 
predisposition and a diagnosed condition can be hazy. Yet age, sex, and mani-
fested conditions are all relevant to the risk rating traditionally at the heart of the 
health-insurance industry.
68
 Further, employees already enjoyed antidiscrimina-
tion protection for these attributes in the form of Title VII, the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, and the ADA. Again, GINA’s modesty reﬂects its pur-
pose. Congress designed the law to provide just enough protection to encourage 
people to undergo genetic testing for disease risk, not to create a robust, new 
antidiscrimination regime. 
c. Prohibited Conduct 
GINA also departs from traditional antidiscrimination legislation in the type 
of conduct it prohibits. It forbids not only discriminatory treatment, but also 
inquiries related to protected status. This novel form of protection has generated 
confusion about the remedies available under GINA’s employment private right 
of action. What damages are appropriate when an employer seeks genetic infor-
mation but fails to take a corresponding adverse employment action? As dis-
cussed at greater length in Part II, at least one jury thought 2.2 million dollars 
was a fair amount.
69
 GINA seeks to make individuals more comfortable with 
genetic testing not only by protecting against discrimination, but also by safe-
guarding privacy. 
GINA also adopts a relatively comprehensive deﬁnition of what it means to 
discriminate. The insurance title forbids using genetic information to determine 
coverage, eligibility, or premiums; obtaining genetic information for underwrit-




67. See supra notes 20-22. 
68. For example, Mark Rothstein observes that “GINA does not prohibit discrimination based on 
an individual’s own health history because such a provision would prohibit health insurers 
from using health status in underwriting.” Mark A. Rothstein, GINA at Ten and the Future of 
Genetic Nondiscrimination Law, 48 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 3, 5 (2018). 
69. Daniel Wiessner, Georgia Workers Win $2.2 Million in ‘Devious Defecator’ Case, REUTERS (June 
23, 2015, 11:56 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-verdict-dna-defecator/Georgia 
-workers-win-2-2-million-in-devious-defecator-case-idUSKBN0P31TP20150623 [https://
perma.cc/9AW2-7MMW]. 
70. Roberts, supra note 13, at 451-52. 
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employment title prohibits hiring, ﬁring, classifying, or otherwise disadvantag-
ing employees on the basis of genetic information.
71
 
d. Broad Exceptions 
GINA’s employment provision offers six exceptions for legally obtaining ge-
netic information. GINA permits an employer to obtain genetic information un-
der a variety of conditions, including (1) inadvertently; (2) through voluntary 
wellness programs; (3) when processing medical leave; (4) via commercially 
available documents, like newspapers that contain obituaries; (5) for the occu-
pational monitoring of toxic substances; and (6) to ensure quality control of 
DNA analysis in law enforcement.
72
 
Employees may inadvertently share genetic information with their cowork-
ers, an issue GINA’s supporters termed the “water cooler problem.”
73
 For exam-
ple, if a person tells her boss that her sister was diagnosed with breast cancer, she 
has just shared statutorily protected genetic information with her employer. 
Foreseeing this issue, GINA’s architects included an exception for inadvertently 
acquiring genetic information, as long as the employer safeguards it and does 
not use it to discriminate.
74
 
As noted, GINA includes an exception to its rule against requests for genetic 
information if employees participate in voluntary wellness programs.
75
 While 
the distinction between mandatory and voluntary wellness programs may seem 
straightforward, what constitutes a “voluntary” program has been the subject of 
litigation. The salient question is whether employers may offer a ﬁnancial in-
 
71. Id. at 452. 
72. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 202(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b) 
(2018). 
73. H.R. REP. NO. 110-28, pt. 1, at 37-38 (2007); Regulations Under the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 68912, 68919 (Nov. 9, 2010) (codiﬁed at 29 
C.F.R. pt. 1635) (“Congress did not want casual conversation among co-workers regarding 
health to trigger federal litigation whenever someone mentioned something that might con-
stitute protected family medical history.”). 
74. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 202(b)(1) (excepting an employer who “inad-
vertently requests or requires family medical history”); id. § 202(c) (requiring that even if 
genetic information is obtained through an exception, it “may not be used in violation of 
[GINA’s discrimination provisions] or treated or disclosed in a manner that violates [GINA’s 
conﬁdentiality provisions]”). 
75. See id. § 202(b) (insulating voluntary wellness programs that request genetic information or 
family medical history). 
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ducement to participate—and if so, how much of an incentive—and still ensure 
that participation is voluntary.
76
 
In 2016, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) weighed 
in on this debate. It promulgated regulations clarifying that an employer may 
indeed offer an incentive for the employee or her spouse to participate in a well-
ness program that involves sharing medical data as long as the inducement does 
not exceed thirty percent of the cost of coverage under the plan.
77
 An employer 
may not, however, offer the employee an incentive in exchange for her spouse’s 
or children’s genetic information.
78
 Similarly, the employer may not provide any 
inducement to the employee or spouse to agree to the sale, exchange, or disclo-
sure of genetic information.
79
 
However, in late 2017, a federal district court vacated these regulations as of 
January 1, 2019, ﬁnding that the EEOC “failed to adequately explain its decision 
to construe the term ‘voluntary’ in the ADA and GINA to permit the 30% incen-
tive level [that was] adopted.”
80
 The EEOC is now in the process of revising 
these regulations. Wellness programs are likely to continue to be scrutinized and 
face legal challenges since they disproportionately affect mobilized constituen-




76. Courts, however, have avoided deciding the issue. See, e.g., EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 131  
F. Supp. 3d 849 (W.D. Wis. 2015); EEOC v. Orion Energy Sys., 145 F. Supp. 3d 841 (E.D. Wis. 
2015). 
77. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31143, 31158 (May 17, 2016) (codi-
ﬁed at 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(2)(iii)(A) (2018)). But see Ifeoma Ajunwa et al., Limitless Worker 
Surveillance, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 735, 768 (2017) (observing that while the EEOC’s regulations 
deﬁne a voluntary wellness program as one which does not “penalize” employees for declining 
participation, they fail to take a position on what would constitute a penalty). 
78. See 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(2)(iii) (“No inducement may be offered, however, in return for the 
spouse’s providing his or her own genetic information, including results of his or her genetic 
tests, or for information about the manifestation of disease or disorder in an employee’s chil-
dren, including adult children.”). 
79. Id. § 1635.8(b)(2)(iv) (mandating that a covered entity may not provide any inducement “in 
exchange for an agreement permitting the sale, exchange, sharing, transfer, or other disclosure 
of genetic information”). 
80. AARP v. EEOC, 267 F. Supp. 3d 14, 37 (D.D.C. 2017), amended by 292 F. Supp. 3d 238 (D.D.C. 
2017) (staying the effective date of the vacatur order until January 1, 2019). 
81. See, e.g., Statement by AARP EVP Nancy LeaMond on EEOC Workplace Wellness Program Rules, 
AARP (May 16, 2016), https://press.aarp.org/2016-05-16-Statement-by-AARP-EVP-Nancy 
-LeaMond-on-EEOC-Workplace-Wellness-Program-Rules [https://perma.cc/2MAV 
-DHLA] [hereinafter LeaMond Statement] (noting that older workers “are more likely to have 
the very types of less visible medical conditions and disabilities . . . that are at risk of disclosure 
by wellness questionnaires and exams”). 
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i i .  gina in practice 
Despite GINA’s lengthy legislative history and novel protections, the statute 
arrived with more of a ﬁzzle than a bang. In Part II, we catalog all available GINA 
cases and consider how GINA has performed in the courts. Although Congress 
drafted the law primarily as a protection against discrimination based on ge-
netic-test results, remarkably there have been no such claims in the entirety of 
GINA’s ﬁrst ten years. 
This Part then turns to GINA’s largely chilly reception as a piece of antidis-
crimination legislation and outlines why many commentators labeled the statute 
a failure from the very start. Criticized for being ineffective, unnecessary, and 
irrelevant, the law might seem like a disappointment so far. While we do not 
challenge the predominant view that GINA has not delivered on its original 
aims, our case research suggests that—despite popular opinion—GINA has had 
signiﬁcant, albeit unforeseen, beneﬁts. Upon closer inspection, the cases reveal 
that GINA is enjoying a second life as an unexpected protection for employee 
privacy. 
A. GINA’s First Ten Years 
Some data sets involve thousands of cases. At other times the bounded na-
ture of the inquiry or the newness of a law will result in a smaller set of cases.
82
 
For our case study, we reviewed all the published and unpublished federal deci-
sions in which courts considered a GINA claim, spanning from November 2009, 
the month in which GINA’s employment provisions became effective, until June 
2018.
83
 Of those 184 cases, we found seventy-seven orders that involved plausible 
 
82. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex 
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 1749, 1767 (1990) (analyzing ﬁfty-four employment discrimination cases in which a 
lower federal court addressed the argument that sex segregation is a reﬂection of women’s 
lack of interest in certain types of jobs); Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 
95, 116-17 (2010) (comparing ﬁfty-nine cases decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544 (2007), to sixty-ﬁve cases decided after, in order 
to determine the case’s impact on motions to dismiss in the disability discrimination context). 
83. The 184 decisions were compiled in the following way: We ﬁrst identiﬁed our complete set of 
cases through searching “‘Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act’ or ‘Genetic Infor-
mation Non-discrimination Act’” in the federal court databases on both Westlaw and Lexis. 
We restricted the date range to November 21, 2009—the date GINA’s Title II employment 
provisions became effective—through June 17, 2018. For Westlaw, this yielded 253 cases and 
for Lexis, this yielded 278 cases. Notably, both Westlaw and Lexis had unique cases that the 
other database did not have, so that our total universe of unique cases across the two databases 
was 288 cases. After eliminating from the set of 288 those cases that only mentioned GINA, 
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GINA claims. We deﬁne a “plausible” claim to mean that the actual facts relate 
to GINA or that the plaintiff at least presents an argument for why GINA’s pro-
visions should apply.
84
 These seventy-seven federal orders pertain to forty-eight 
unique cases.
85
 For our study, we selected the order for each case that was most 
relevant to the GINA claim. 
Like any case study, our research has its limits. All of these disputes arise 
under GINA’s employment provision, as the health-insurance title does not in-
clude an explicit private right of action. Generally speaking, very few disputes 
are ever litigated, and even fewer go to trial or get appealed. Of those cases that 
come before a judge and result in an opinion, many are unreported.
86
 Accord-
ingly, some disputes that have arisen under GINA will naturally fall outside this 
study. Nevertheless, this study does give us a window into some of the claims 
being litigated,
87
 the relative strength of those claims, and which fact patterns 
are likely to result in a ﬁnding of liability. Here we explore: (1) the judicial inter-
pretation of GINA’s statutory terms; (2) common types of claims; and (3) the 
juridical challenges in proving GINA violations. 
 
but did not involve an actual claim under the statute, we were left with a pool of 184 published 
and unpublished decisions. 
84. Here, we largely sought to eliminate cases in which a plaintiff simply ﬁled under the statute 
even though the facts did not begin to suggest a GINA claim. The typical case we cut at this 
point might involve a plaintiff who claimed race or sex discrimination at the EEOC, but then 
who showed up at the district court suing under every federal antidiscrimination statute. In 
approximately sixty percent of the 184 cases in which there was a GINA claim, the Plaintiffs 
did not plead any facts that could conceivably support such a claim. 
85. These cases are noted in the Appendix. The forty-eight ﬁgure represents a subset of the 184 
cases reviewed for this Feature. See supra note 83 and accompanying text regarding our meth-
odology for arriving at this set of cases. For these forty-eight cases, we collected both factual 
and analytical data. See infra Appendix. The data compiled from each case included: the fac-
tual basis for a GINA claim; what other claims were brought; and the result of the order. We 
also coded cases for those that involved discussion of a statutory term; these included the 
meaning of “genetic information,” unlawful “requests,” “genetic tests,” “employees,” “em-
ployers,” and lawful wellness programs. Courts sometimes gave more than one reason for 
their decision and, in the interest of completeness, multiple reasons were listed if they were 
supplied by the court. Finally, we coded cases for those that involved common factual scenar-
ios, such as requests for medical exams or records, family medical histories, ﬁtness-for-duty 
exams, wellness programs, workers’ compensation claims, drug tests, DNA tests, and HIV 
tests. 
86. As George Priest and Benjamin Klein observed in their landmark study, appellate cases are 
neither random nor representative of disputes, which makes it difficult to draw inferences 
from “legal rules to social behavior.” George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Dis-
putes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-4 (1984). 
87. In particular, the claims that judges think are important enough to warrant an opinion. 
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1. GINA’s Statutory Terms 
First, the cases shed light on whom GINA has protected and how it has pro-
tected them. Like any statute, GINA requires interpretation. Our case study re-
veals that courts tend to resolve GINA claims on the basis of just a few statutory 
terms. Of the forty-eight cases, thirty-one involve orders that turned, in part or 




CASES RESOLVED (IN PART OR WHOLE) UNDER GINA’S STATUTORY TERMS 
 
Most cases turn on the meaning of “genetic information.” Recall that Con-
gress deﬁned genetic information as genetic-test results, genetic-test results of 
family members, and family medical history.
89
 Even with this relatively precise 
deﬁnition, plaintiffs appear to misuse the statute by treating “genetic discrimi-
nation” as a catch-all cause of action.
90
 In particular, nine of the eighteen cases 
 
88. The other seventeen orders either involve a procedural resolution (such as dismissal because 
the plaintiff failed to cooperate in discovery or prosecute the claim) or do not fully resolve the 
claims (such as failure to dismiss because the claim is plausible or the plaintiff is found to 
deserve more time to present supporting facts). Notably, the orders in these seventeen cases 
do not construe substantive provisions of GINA. 
89. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 201(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A) 
(2018). 
90. See supra note 84 (observing that in approximately sixty percent of cases in which there was a 
GINA claim, the plaintiffs either did not plead any facts to support such a claim or pled facts 
that could not conceivably warrant such a claim). 








Number of cases (out of 31)
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resolved by the meaning of “genetic information” involve plaintiffs arguing es-
sentially that their discrimination claims somehow have their origins in biology 
and thus the employer violated GINA. This understandable but attenuated logic 













Courts have resisted such sweeping interpretations by upholding the distinc-
tion between genetic information and other types of medical information. Con-
gress anticipated that plaintiffs might confuse biological conditions with genetic 
information and included a section in the statute expressly entitled “Medical In-
formation that Is Not Genetic Information.”
96
 This section explains that an em-
ployee’s “manifested disease, disorder, or pathological condition that has or may 
have a genetic basis” is not genetic information.
97
 Plaintiffs with employment 
discrimination claims that relate to their own diagnoses or illnesses may well 
prevail on a claim under the ADA, but are unlikely to succeed under GINA. An-
other source of confusion may be that a diagnosis or illness in a person’s family 
constitutes genetic information. But once the person’s own genetic tendency be-
comes a diagnosable condition, that condition is not the person’s genetic infor-
mation pursuant to GINA. 
 
91. Robinson v. Dungarvin Nev., LLC, No. 2:16-CV-00902-JAD-PAL, 2018 WL 547225, at *5 (D. 
Nev. Jan. 24, 2018) (“Race is protected under Title VII, not under GINA.”); Booker v. Gregg, 
No. 1:16-CV-187-JDF, 2016 WL 443798, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 23, 2016) (holding that stating 
that one’s “genetics are African American” does not bring a plaintiff within GINA’s ambit). 
92. Jacobs v. Donnelly Commc’ns, No. 1:13-CV-980-WSD, 2013 WL 5436682 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 
2013) (ﬁnding that allergies are not “genetic information” under GINA). 
93. Hoffman v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 3d 631, 637 (W.D.N.C. 2015) (“Neither 
Plaintiff’s HIV diagnosis, kidney failure, nor viral gastroenteritis, constitute genetic infor-
mation about a manifested disease or disorder.”). 
94. Duignan v. City of Chicago, 275 F. Supp. 3d 933, 939 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“Because plaintiff spe-
ciﬁcally alleges that her psychosis ‘was organic in nature and a clinical manifestation of Hun-
tington’s disease,’ I conclude that she has pled herself out of any claim that defendant took an 
adverse action against her based on her genetic information, as opposed to on her actual di-
agnosis of Huntington’s disease.”). 
95. Bell v. PSS World Med., Inc., No. 3:12-CV-381-J-99MMH-JRK, 2012 WL 6761660, at *3 
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2012) (“Because Plaintiff has failed to provide any basis, factual or other-
wise, for the Court to reasonably infer that her hyperthyroidism, the ‘conﬁdential infor-
mation,’ or the ‘conﬁdential medical conditions’ equate to genetic testing and/or genetic in-
formation, Plaintiff has failed to properly allege a valid claim under GINA.”). 
96. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 210, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-9 (2018). 
97. Id. 
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Perhaps the most surprising observation is that we did not identify any cases 
in which the plaintiff opted to have her DNA tested.
98
 Even in the cases that 
involved actual DNA tests, which are discussed further below,
99
 those employees 
did not choose to be tested and the employer did not take any negative action 
based upon the test results.
100
 
Notwithstanding a lack of actual genetic tests, plaintiffs have read GINA’s 
provisions broadly to oppose a variety of tests that they argue solicit genetic in-
formation. In this type of case, employers ask employees to undergo assess-
ments, and the workers resist. Employers make these requests for many reasons, 
from biometric screenings for employee-wellness programs to forensic genetic 
testing for suspected conduct violations. These are not stories of employees who, 
of their own volition, undergo testing and experience subsequent discrimina-
tion. These cases instead show that employers are seeking information about 





 and biometric screenings
103
 are not genetic tests. 
Health information obtained through biometric screenings,
104
 like those for 
cholesterol and blood pressure, is another source of potential confusion. Bio-
metric screenings are particularly common in employer-provided wellness pro-
 
98. Of course, if employees are being ﬁred after taking genetic tests, they might still be securing 
settlements from their employer. 
99. See infra Section II.C.1. 
100. Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Grp. Retail Servs. Atlanta, LLC, 102 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 
2015) (concerning an employer who required employees to submit to cheek swabs to try to 
solve the mystery of who was defecating in the warehouse); Complaint at 2, Williamson v. 
Fermi Nat’l Accelerator Lab., No. 1:13-CV-04221, 2015 WL 360382 (E.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2015) 
(involving an employer who required an employee to provide a DNA sample in the course of 
her employment). 
101. Lewis v. Gov’t of the D.C., 161 F. Supp. 3d 15, 33 (D.D.C. 2015) (ﬁnding that “nothing in the 
Complaint suggests that, through its drug-test policy, the District requested genetic infor-
mation as that phrase is deﬁned by [GINA]” (emphasis omitted)). 
102. Hoffman v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 3d 631, 637 (W.D.N.C. 2015) (“[G]iven 
that an HIV test is not a genetic test, any information Plaintiff alleges Defendant disclosed 
about his HIV diagnosis or test contained in Plaintiff’s folder is not considered genetic infor-
mation protected by GINA.”). 
103. See, e.g., Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 824, 826 (5th Cir. 2015) (hold-
ing that a required medical exam that included medical history, physical examination, blood 
tests, urinalysis, vision test, hearing test, lung capacity test, chest x-ray, and stress test did not 
fall under the meaning of “genetic test” in GINA); Fuentes v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 
240 F. Supp. 3d 634, 644 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (same). 
104. According to the CDC, “biometric screening” is “the measurement of physical characteristics 
such as height, weight, body mass index, blood pressure, blood cholesterol, blood glucose, 
and aerobic ﬁtness tests that can be taken at the worksite and used as part of a workplace 




 Some litigants have attempted to challenge these requests for medical 
information as violations of GINA.
106
 Claims may arise when employees feel 
compelled to participate in a voluntary wellness program, perhaps because their 
employer offers to further subsidize their insurance premiums in exchange for 
participating. Employees may opt in but later resent participation and challenge 
the wellness program. Alternatively, the employer may lawfully require employ-
ees to participate in a wellness program if it does not seek genetic (or disability-
related) information.
107
 A biometric screening, like a test for drugs or HIV, is not 
“an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites that 
detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes.”
108
 Under the plain lan-
guage of the statute, these are neither genetic tests nor requests for genetic data. 
One court responding to a wellness-program claim quipped that the plaintiff 
“appears to misread the statute as forbidding any mandatory wellness program, 
regardless of whether it involves a request for or the acquisition of genetic infor-
mation.”
109
 Depending on the circumstances, a plaintiff may have a valid ADA 
claim related to nongenetic medical testing, but GINA does not cover such tests. 
While the results of biometric screenings are not genetic information, family 
medical history is. Cases involving requests for family medical history, as dis-
cussed further below,
110
 have generally been the most successful. Litigants have 
also succeeded on claims alleging not just a request for family medical history, 
but discrimination on that basis. In Bronsdon v. City of Naples,
111
 a ﬁreﬁghter was 
diagnosed with hypertension and coronary artery disease, both of which were 
 
health assessment to benchmark and evaluate changes in employee health status over time.” 
Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Workplace Health Glossary, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVICES https://www.cdc.gov/workplacehealthpromotion/tools-resources/glossary 
/glossary.html [https://perma.cc/UF4Q-EC8Z]. 
105. Wellness programs are broadly deﬁned as “program[s] of health promotion or disease pre-
vention.” 26 C.F.R § 54.9802-1(f) (2018). Healthcare.gov explains that wellness programs are 
“program[s] intended to improve and promote health and ﬁtness [that are] usually offered 
through the work place, although insurance plans can offer them directly to their enrollees. 
The program allows [an] employer or plan to offer [the employee] premium discounts, cash 
rewards, gym memberships, and other incentives to participate.” Wellness Programs, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/wellness-programs [https://perma
.cc/3R7H-29E9]. It is therefore not the entity that provides the program but its content and 
services that deﬁnes a wellness program. 
106. Ortiz, 806 F.3d at 826-27; Fuentes, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 644-45. 
107. See, e.g., Ortiz, 806 F.3d at 826. 
108. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 201(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A) 
(2018) (deﬁning “genetic tests”). 
109. Ortiz, 806 F.3d at 826. 
110. See infra Section II.C. 
111. No. 2:13-CV-778-FtM-29CM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70502 (M.D. Fla. May 22, 2014). 
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related to his family medical history. When he ﬁled for workers’ compensation 
beneﬁts, the City denied the claim based upon his “genetic information and fam-
ily medical history.”
112
 The ﬁreﬁghter sued, claiming that the denial violated 
GINA. The City countered that his manifested conditions prevented him from 
advancing a claim under GINA.
113
 However, the court noted rather simply that 
employers cannot discriminate based on family medical history, even if the indi-
vidual has already manifested a related condition.
114
 The court relied on the 
EEOC regulations, which make it clear that “genetic information of an individual 
with a manifested disease is protected genetic information under GINA and that 
discrimination against someone based on this information is prohibited.”
115
 
Much like a “mixed-motives” claim under Title VII,
116
 genetic information and 
an employee’s manifested condition may sometimes fuse, making it hard to say 
which is responsible for an act of discrimination. In such instances, the employer 
may still be held liable because an impermissible consideration has tainted the 
decision. 
Despite robust protection for family medical history, some courts have lim-
ited the scope of genetic information in contravention of the plain meaning of 
the statute. GINA’s text covers “manifested conditions” in family members and 
does not limit those conditions to ones that are hereditary.
117
 Regardless, some 
courts have found that family medical history is only genetic information if it 
communicates genetic risk. In practical terms, these courts are taking the posi-




112. Id. at *3. 
113. Id. at *8. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. (quoting Regulations Under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 75 
Fed. Reg. 68912, 68918 (Nov. 9, 2010) (codiﬁed at 29 C.F.R. § 1635.12(b) (2018))). 
116. Most decisions in life are made for more than one reason, a reality that antidiscrimination law 
has sought to address. Under section 703(m) of Title VII, if race, sex, religion, color, or na-
tional origin is a motivating factor for the employment practice, that act is unlawful. The 
presence of other legitimate motives—even if the employer would have made the same deci-
sion absent the illegitimate motives—is not a defense for purposes of liability. However, in a 
mixed-motive discrimination case, the defendant can still avoid economic damages (such as 
back pay or front pay) or reinstatement by showing he would have made the same decision in 
the absence of the illegal motivating factor. If the defendant can make this showing, the plain-
tiff is entitled only to declaratory and injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, and costs. See 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2018). 
117. Regulations Under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 68916. 
118. The EEOC has also supported this view with its observation that “GINA is concerned pri-
marily with protecting those individuals who may be discriminated against because an em-
ployer thinks they are at increased risk of acquiring a condition in the future.” Background In-
formation for EEOC Final Rule on Title II of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 
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Poore v. Peterbilt of Bristol, L.L.C.,
119
 the ﬁrst in this line of cases, dealt with 
an employee whose wife had multiple sclerosis (MS). The court held that the 
wife’s MS was not genetic information because it “has no predictive value with 
respect to Poore’s genetic propensity to acquire the disease.”
120
 Further, while 
genetic information is deﬁned to include the manifestation of a disease in a fam-
ily member, family members are in turn deﬁned in such a way as to exclude 
spouses.
121
 The court ultimately reasoned that because a spouse’s MS does not 
communicate genetic risk, it cannot be genetic information. 
Another court dismissed a GINA claim brought by an employee whose 
mother had HIV/AIDS.
122
 Diagnosed HIV/AIDS is quite clearly a manifested 
condition and, unlike spouses, mothers are unequivocally family members under 
the statute. Thus, on its face, GINA would seem to apply.
123
 Yet the court found 
that the employee was not at risk of acquiring HIV/AIDS
124
 because HIV/AIDS 
can only be transmitted from mother to child in three ways: during pregnancy, 
during childbirth, or through breastfeeding.
125
 Thus, according to the court, the 
employee had no GINA claim because she had no actual genetic risk of acquiring 
HIV/AIDS.
126
 However, Poore and its progeny may be misguided. As explained, 
nothing in the plain language of GINA’s deﬁnition of covered genetic infor-





2008, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations
/gina-background.cfm [https://perma.cc/APW8-3VJW]. 
119. 852 F. Supp. 2d 727, 729 (W.D. Va. 2012). 
120. Id. at 731. 
121. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 201(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(3) (2018) 
(deﬁning family members as dependents and any other ﬁrst-, second-, third-, or fourth-de-
gree relatives). 
122. Conner-Goodgame v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:12-CV-03426-IPJ, 2013 WL 5428448, at 
*11 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 2013). 
123. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 201(3). 
124. Conner-Goodgame, 2013 WL 5428448, at *32 (holding that an employee’s mother’s AIDS is not 
genetic information with respect to that employee because the employee has “no chance of 
acquiring HIV in the future as a result of her deceased mother’s AIDS”). 
125. See Preventing Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV, HIV.GOV (May 15, 2017), https://www
.hiv.gov/hiv-basics/hiv-prevention/reducing-mother-to-child-risk/preventing-mother-to 
-child-transmission-of-hiv [https://perma.cc/8TZQ-TKDJ] (“An HIV-positive mother can 
transmit HIV to her baby [] during pregnancy, childbirth (also called labor and delivery), or 
breastfeeding.”). 
126. Conner-Goodgame, 2013 WL 5428448, at *32. 
127. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text; infra notes 281-283 and accompanying text. 
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2. Common GINA Claims 
A different way of analyzing GINA’s cases is to cluster them by recurring 
factual scenarios. Of the forty-eight plausible GINA cases, certain types of facts 
and allegations tend to predominate. The starting point is the plaintiff’s posture 
as it relates to employment.
 
FIGURE 2.128  
THE PLAINTIFF’S POSTURE 
 
 
As Figure 2 indicates, the majority (twenty-six plaintiffs, or approximately 
ﬁfty-four percent) sued after being terminated by their employer. Few cases in-
volved claims that the employer failed to hire the plaintiff. This result is con-
sistent with the frequently observed difficulty of bringing failure-to-hire em-
ployment discrimination cases.
129
 Interestingly, ﬁve of the claims involved no 
 
128. These claims are a snapshot of what we coded and included in a table as the Appendix. The 
employment harms span forty-eight cases, but the number of employment harms here adds 
up to more than forty-eight because employees sometimes experienced more than one type 
of harm (for example, perhaps they were denied reinstatement, harassed, and subsequently 
terminated). 
129. There are stark informational barriers that prevent victims of discrimination from detecting 
and bringing failure-to-hire claims. Any contact between an applicant and an employer is 
“typically ﬂeeting, the eventual outcome is unknown to the candidate, and the process itself 










Number of cases (out of 48)
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obvious adverse employment action or constructive discharge,
130
 a result made 
possible by the fact that GINA forbids certain types of inquiries even where there 
is no actual discriminatory treatment.
131
 
The actual claims provide a second frame that illuminates how plaintiffs use 
GINA, as shown in Figure 3. 
FIGURE 3.132 
PREDOMINANCE OF CERTAIN CLAIMS 
 
 As explained in Part I, GINA has both privacy and antidiscrimination pro-
visions. First, it is unlawful to “request, require, or purchase” genetic infor-
mation, subject to several exceptions.
133
 Second, employers cannot use genetic 
information—regardless of how it is obtained—to discriminate. Discrimination 
claims have naturally predominated. After all, this way of framing claims is 
 
rarely signals exclusionary intent.” Michael Fix et al., An Overview of Auditing for Discrimina-
tion, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA 1, 
14 (Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993). 
130. These cases are coded as “n/a” under Employee’s Posture. 
131. See supra Section I.B.3.c. 
132. These claims are coded and included in a table as the Appendix. The number of cases here 
adds up to more than forty-eight because plaintiffs sometimes advance more than one claim 
under GINA. 
133. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 202(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b) 
(2018). The three most notable anomalies are wellness programs, inadvertent requests of fam-
ily medical history, and instances where an employer purchases publicly available documents 
that include family medical history. Id. § 202(b)(1)-(2), (4). The other three exceptions con-
cern compliance with other laws, such as the Family and Medical Leave Act and genetic mon-
itoring regulations, or ensuring the integrity of law enforcement. Id. § 202(b)(3), (5)-(6). 







Number of cases (out of 48)
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standard under existing federal discrimination laws. But many GINA claims in 
the past ten years have been simply for unlawful requests. 
Another way that plaintiffs appear to be wielding GINA as a privacy shield 
is by claiming that an employer, who may have legally obtained genetic infor-
mation, disclosed that information in violation of GINA. If an employer has ac-
quired genetic information through one of GINA’s statutory exceptions, it must 
safeguard that information. But in seven (approximately ﬁfteen percent) of the 
cases, plaintiffs claimed that their employers disclosed or shared conﬁdential ge-
netic information with other employees or coworkers. This set of cases may 
demonstrate that employees do not want their conﬁdential information shared 
with other people at work. We found that nearly forty percent of all cases in-
volved claims based upon requests for family medical history, requests for med-




Finally, wellness programs reemerge as another area of sensitivity for plain-
tiffs. Most recently, this issue has captured the attention of several important 
advocacy groups, such as AARP, an advocacy group for older Americans, and 
those that advocate for people with disabilities. They are concerned that health 
disclosures under wellness plans would create disadvantage for their members 





134. There are twelve cases that involve claims for unlawful requests and seven that involve the 
claim that the employer unlawfully disclosed genetic information. See infra Appendix. 
135. See, e.g., LeaMond Statement, supra note 81 (“Older workers in particular are more likely to 
have the very types of less visible medical conditions and disabilities—such as diabetes, heart 
disease, and cancer—that are at risk of disclosure by wellness questionnaires and exams. By 
ﬁnancially coercing employees into surrendering their personal health information, these 
rules will weaken medical privacy and civil rights protections.”). 
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FIGURE 4.136 
PREDOMINANCE OF CERTAIN FACTS 
 As Figure 4 makes clear,
 
a host of GINA cases involve plaintiffs bringing 
claims based on requests for medical exams or records. Many of these requests 
simultaneously solicit individual and family medical history, the latter often 
through questions about how one’s parents died or whether family members 
have experienced certain medical conditions. Family medical history may also 
surface in a factual context where the employer asks an employee to undergo a 
ﬁtness-for-duty assessment.
137
 At other times, the allegedly improper request 
pertains to a legally sanctioned process, such as seeking accommodations under 
the ADA, unemployment beneﬁts, or workers’ compensation beneﬁts.
138
 Em-
ployers sometimes also request family medical history in conjunction with well-
ness programs as part of their health risk assessment.
139
 Still other times, the 
family medical history is voluntarily disclosed or somehow otherwise discov-
 
136. These facts are just a sampling of what we coded and included in a table as the Appendix. 
137. See supra ﬁg.4; see also infra Appendix. (identifying nine federal cases with plausible GINA 
claims where the factual scenario included a ﬁtness-for-duty examination). 
138. See supra ﬁg.4; see also infra Appendix. (identifying federal cases with plausible GINA claims 
where the factual scenario included a workers’ compensation claim and unemployment com-
pensation claims, as well as other instances where genetic discrimination may be at issue). 
139. See supra ﬁg.4; see also infra Appendix. (identifying federal cases with plausible GINA claims, 
including two where the factual scenario included a mandatory wellness-program assess-
ment). 





Other disclosure of family medical history
Fitness for duty exam
Requests for family medical history
Request for medical exam or records
Number of cases (out of 48)
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ered. Finally, falling outside of the family-medical-history context are direct tests 
that employees must sometimes undergo. The most common are drug tests—
which are usually not a problem under the statute
140
—but there are other types 
of exams that may solicit genetic information and thus violate GINA. 
3. Challenges in Proving Violations 
Employees have encountered difficulty establishing valid GINA claims under 
both the privacy and antidiscrimination provisions. Speciﬁcally, GINA’s many 
exceptions for acquiring genetic information may undermine a seemingly valid 
claim. Consider the exception for inadvertent acquisition, for example. In Wil-
liams v. Graphic Packaging International, the plaintiff was diagnosed with prostate 
cancer and, after inappropriate behavior at work, was eventually terminated.
141
 
He alleged genetic discrimination, including that he was questioned repeatedly 
about cancer test results and treatment options.
142
 But the court noted that Wil-
liams voluntarily disclosed to three coworkers “that cancer ran in his family.”
143
 
While a family medical history of cancer is unequivocally genetic information, 
the employer did not unlawfully request or obtain it.
144
 (However, if the em-
ployer had asked Williams about his family medical history, that would have 
been enough to sustain a cause of action under GINA—even without an adverse 
employment action.) 
Another difficulty for plaintiffs has sometimes come in the context of well-
ness programs. Recall that employers can request, through a health-care profes-
sional or genetic counselor, genetic information in the context of a wellness pro-
gram as long as employees participate voluntarily and provide written 
 
140. But cf. Sullivan v. Lowe’s HIW, Inc., No. C15-1184JLR, 2015 WL 6439097 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 
22, 2015) (involving a drug test in the form of a cheek swab that enabled handlers to collect 
plaintiff’s genetic data, but not answering the question of whether GINA permits the drug 
test and instead holding that the plaintiff failed to satisfy GINA’s administrative-exhaustion 
requirement). 
141. No. 1:16-CV-00102, 2018 WL 2118311, at *1-2 (M.D. Tenn. May 8, 2018). 
142. Complaint at 1, 4-7, Williams, 2018 WL 2118311 (No. 1:16-CV-00102); see also Williams, 2018 
WL 2118311, at *9 (“Plaintiff argues [that] Lee repeatedly questioned Plaintiff about his can-
cer.”). 
143. Williams, 2018 WL 2118311, at *9. 
144. The court in Williams did not squarely address whether Graphic Packaging actually discrim-
inated or acted based on information related to Williams’s cancer. 




 Thus, as one court found, a mandatory wellness program that re-
quests genetic information would violate the statute.
146
 However, where the pro-
gram was deemed voluntary, a misguided plaintiff could not claim his employer 
had impermissibly acquired genetic information.
147
 
Claimants have had even less luck establishing claims for genetic discrimi-
nation that turn on whether an employer took an adverse employment action 
based on genetic information. The ﬁrst failure is the most rudimentary: an em-
ployee is sometimes unable to show that the employer possessed the employee’s 
genetic information.
148
 In these cases, employees allege genetic discrimination 
but fail to establish that decision-makers were actually aware of the employee’s 
genetic information.
149
 These claims are dead on arrival since an employer can-
not base a decision on facts she does not know. 
In a second category of unsuccessful claims of genetic discrimination, the 
employer may have had access to genetic information, but there is no evidence 
that the employer took any adverse employment action.
150
 For example, in one 
federal appellate case—a rarity among GINA claims
151
—a staffing agency termi-
 
145. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
146. Lee v. City of Moraine Fire Dep’t, No. 3:13-CV-222, 2015 WL 914440, at *15 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 
3, 2015) (ﬁnding that a mandatory request for genetic information cannot qualify under the 
wellness-program exception since the touchstone of this exception is that the program is vol-
untary). 
147. Id. at *12. 
148. See, e.g., Higgins v. Union Pac. R.R., 303 F. Supp. 3d 945, 962 (D. Neb. 2018) (noting that the 
plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that his employer received 
his “entire medical chart,” which allegedly included plaintiff’s genetic information); Jones v. 
Foxx, No. 16-2207-CM, 2018 WL 705665, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 5, 2018) (noting that “[t]he 
uncontroverted facts show that Smith was unaware that plaintiff had sickle cell”); Rusthoven 
v. Victor Sch. Dist. No. 7, No. CV 14-170-M-DLC, 2014 WL 6460190, at *4 (D. Mont. Nov. 
17, 2014) (observing that the plaintiff did not allege that his genetic information was ever seen 
by a decision-maker or by plaintiff’s coworkers); Tovar v. United Airlines Inc., 985 F. Supp. 
2d 862, 874-75 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (ﬁnding no evidence that decision-makers were aware of the 
employee’s family medical history when they terminated the employee). 
149. Alternatively, an employer is sometimes able to show that the genetic information in question 
was actually unavailable at the time of the adverse employment decision. See Carroll v. Com-
prehensive Women’s Health Servs., No. 3:16CV1509, 2017 WL 4284386, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 
27, 2017) (observing that the employee was ﬁred one day after her genetic testing, and thus 
before her employer could have known the results). 
150. See, e.g., Leone v. N.J. Orthopaedic Specialists, P.A., No. 11-3957 (ES), 2012 WL 1535198, at *6 
(D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2012) (observing that “the allegation fails to plausibly support the theory that 
[the defendant] based his decision on the results of genetic tests”). 
151. Out of the 184 federal court decisions in which courts considered a claim under GINA, only 
four of those came from federal appellate courts, and only two involved plausible GINA 
claims. See infra Appendix.  
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nated a temporary employee after she missed a signiﬁcant amount of work for 
breast-cancer testing.
152
 The employee alleged that she told various people at 
work about her family medical history of breast cancer.
153
 She then claimed that 
her employer may have acted on assumptions about her need for treatment based 
on that information.
154
 The court concluded that even though the employer pos-
sessed statutorily protected genetic information and took an adverse employ-
ment action, a ﬁnding of discrimination “would require rank speculation” about 
what the employer assumed “about the role of a family medical history of breast 
cancer on a breast-cancer patient’s treatment and recovery.”
155
 In short, there 
was no compelling story to support the argument that genetic information mo-
tivated the decision to terminate the employee. 
Strikingly, in GINA’s ﬁrst decade, we uncovered no cases alleging discrimi-
nation based on genetic-test results, which could affirm commentators’ suspi-
cions that GINA is not doing much work as an antidiscrimination statute. Inso-
far as people are successfully suing under GINA, requests for family medical 
history are carrying the day.
156
 GINA cases also signal that plaintiffs have not 
had much success in reported decisions during the statute’s ﬁrst ten years. In 
particular, out of the set of forty-eight cases, twelve came to positive results for 
the plaintiffs,
157
 and seven of those twelve were either left unresolved
158
 or were 
procedural victories for the plaintiff.
159
 Finally, the small universe of cases seems 
to conﬁrm the belief that GINA is useless or perhaps unnecessary. Our case study 
might thus appear to preliminarily validate some of the criticisms of the statute. 
 
152. Punt v. Kelly Servs., 862 F.3d 1040, 1044-45 (10th Cir. 2017). 
153. Id. at 1044. 
154. Id. at 1052. 
155. Id. 
156. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cummins Power Generation Inc., 313 F.R.D. 93 (D. Minn. 2015); Lee v. City 
of Moraine Fire Dep’t, No. 3:13-CV-222, 2015 WL 914440 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2015); EEOC v. 
Founders Pavilion, Inc., No. 13-CV-6250 (CJS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81439 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 
9, 2014); see also Mark A. Rothstein et al., Limiting Occupational Medical Evaluations Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 41 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 523, 554 (2015) (reviewing valid GINA claims that showed violations predominantly 
involved requests for family medical history); sources cited infra note 211 (announcing settle-
ments that have prevailed on this type of factual claim). 
157. See infra Appendix. 
158. For example, not dismissing a GINA claim for an alleged failure to arbitrate prior to ﬁling a 
lawsuit. Jefferson v. Fannie Mae, No. 4:13-CV-00604-ALM-CAN, 2016 WL 5339702 (E.D. 
Tex. July 29, 2016). 
159. For example, granting a plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery under GINA. Harris v. Union 
Pac. R.R. Co., No. 8:16-CV-381, 2018 WL 2729131 (D. Neb. June 6, 2018). 
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B. GINA as a Failure 
One interpretation of GINA’s ﬁrst ten years is that the statute is a failure. In 
fact, from the moment GINA passed, it garnered signiﬁcant criticism.
160
 Ten 
years later, the commentary is not much rosier.
161
 In fact, the scholarly reaction 
to GINA has been almost entirely negative.
162
 There is a signiﬁcant disconnect 
between what the statute has done and what it was intended to do. Recall that 
the paradigmatic GINA violation is discrimination on the basis of a genetic test. 
It is now clear that courts are not deciding and reporting cases that ﬁt the para-
digm. Here, we explore the reasons why so many commentators have dubbed 
GINA a failure. 
1. GINA Is Ineffective 
Typical criticism includes that GINA is ineffective, useless, or both. Arguably, 
GINA did not yet deliver on its original promise in the ten years following the 




160. Scholars were quick to criticize the new law. See, e.g., Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from 
Probable Bonds: A Genetic Tattle Tale Based on Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 50 
n.384 (2010) (arguing that GINA “lacks bravado” and suffers from a variety of limitations); 
Pauline T. Kim, Regulating the Use of Genetic Information: Perspectives from the U.S. Experience, 
31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 693, 700-02 (2010) (asserting that GINA’s exceptions for lawfully 
obtaining genetic information could open the door to discrimination); Roberts, supra note 61, 
at 634-47 (arguing for amending the statute to prohibit unintentional discrimination and al-
low for accommodations); Rothstein, supra note 30, at 174 (calling GINA “fatally ﬂawed”). 
161. See, e.g., Kathy L. Hudson & Karen Pollitz, Undermining Genetic Privacy? Employee Wellness 
Programs and the Law, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 (2017) (arguing that GINA’s wellness-program 
exceptions could be expanded to compromise genetic privacy); Rothstein, supra note 68 (crit-
icizing GINA’s applicability and coverage); Jessica D. Tenenbaum & Kenneth W. Goodman, 
Beyond the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act: Ethical and Economic Implications of the 
Exclusion of Disability, Long-Term Care and Life Insurance, 14 FUTURE MED. 153, 153-54 (2017) 
(arguing that disability and long-term-care insurance are more like health insurance than life 
insurance and should therefore be within GINA’s coverage); Sarah Zhang, DNA Got a Kid 
Kicked Out of School—And It’ll Happen Again, WIRED (Feb. 1, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www
.wired.com/2016/02/schools-kicked-boy-based-dna [https://perma.cc/A5JV-WKX7] (criti-
cizing GINA for not covering education or housing). 
162. But see Barbara J. Evans, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act at Age 10: GINA’s Con-
troversial Assertion that Data Transparency Protects Privacy and Civil Rights, 60 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. (forthcoming) (arguing that GINA has been unfairly criticized and that, through the 
federal regulations governing the HIPAA Privacy Rule, GINA implicitly includes a right to 
access one’s genetic data). 
163. See Sharon Begley, Consumers Aren’t Wild About Genetic Testing—Nor Are Doctors, STAT (Feb. 
12, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/02/12/consumers-arent-wild-genetic-testing 
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While stagnant rates of medical genetic testing may strike some readers as odd, 
there has only recently been a meaningful uptick in genetic testing, since the FDA 
approved direct-to-consumer testing for genetic disease risks in April of 2017.
164 
But insofar as the goal of the legislation was to increase medical genetic testing, 
the law itself does not appear to have had a meaningful impact during its ﬁrst 
decade. There are several possible reasons for that failure. 
a. Lack of Awareness 
Despite a grueling thirteen-year legislative history, GINA passed without 
much fanfare. In fact, the law barely registered as a cultural phenomenon. Sev-
eral years after GINA was legislated, over eighty percent of Americans were un-
aware that the law even existed.
165
 There are at least four reasons for this una-
wareness. 
First, GINA was a relatively unexciting statute upon arrival, the product of 
an enfeebling compromise with the insurance community and other business 
 
-doctors [https://perma.cc/2XAF-ABLQ]; The Public and Genetic Editing, Testing, and Ther-
apy, HARV. T.H. CHAN SCH. PUB. HEALTH 5 (Jan. 2016), https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp 
-content/uploads/sites/94/2016/01/STAT-Harvard-Poll-Jan-2016-Genetic-Technology.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BW7P-QY7V]. 
164. Alzheimer’s Found, of Am., Genetic Testing: Thinking About an At-Home Test for Alzheimer’s 
Risk Gene?, PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases 
/genetic-testing-thinking-about-an-at-home-test-for-alzheimers-risk-gene-300725402.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y86U-ZMTZ]. The direct-to-consumer genetic-testing industry has 
grown from $15 million in sales in 2010 to more than $99 million in 2017. Additionally, the 
genetic-testing industry is projected to reach $310 million in sales by 2022, with approximately 
100 million consumers by that time. Razib Khan & David Mittelman, Consumer Genomics Will 
Change Your Life, Whether You Get Tested or Not, GENOME BIOLOGY (Aug. 20, 2018), https:// 
genomebiology.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13059-018-1506-1 [https://perma.cc
/6AZS-874Q]; Ellen Matloff, Building a Bridge from Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Tests to Reality, 
FORBES (Sept. 23, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenmatloff/2018/09/23/building 
-a-bridge-from-direct-to-consumer-genetic-tests-to-reality [https://perma.cc/QD6H 
-9XQF]. Moreover, new ﬁndings from the National Poll on Healthy Aging show that one in 
ten older adults has taken genetic tests offered to consumers, and one in twenty has taken 
genetic tests ordered by a doctor. Kara Gavin, Older Adults Have High Interest in Genetic Test-
ing—And Some Reservations, U. MICH. HEALTH LAB (Oct. 1, 2018), https://labblog.uofmhealth
.org/lab-report/older-adults-have-high-interest-genetic-testing-and-some-reservations 
[https://perma.cc/TQR6-8G4C]. Most older adults surveyed “expressed interest in getting 
DNA tests to guide medical care, understand health risks or know their ancestry.” Id. In sum, 
genetic testing has not yet occupied a seat in mainstream society, but the second decade of 
GINA will likely see a signiﬁcant uptick in genetic testing. 
165. Louise Slaughter, Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 42, 62 
(2013) (observing that “a nationally representative survey from 2011 indicated that fewer than 
one in ﬁve Americans (16%) are aware [GINA] exists”). 




 Second, unlike the social movements that propelled the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 or the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, GINA was not backed 
by a dynamic and organized coalition that could champion the legislation. Third, 
one of GINA’s two substantive titles became largely moot only two years after 
the law passed. In 2010, the ACA eliminated much of the need for GINA’s health-
insurance protections by outlawing preexisting-condition exclusions, shifting 
away from health-status-based ratings, and cobbling together near-universal 
health-insurance coverage for Americans. Finally, whereas earlier antidiscrimi-
nation laws targeted a history of discrimination, GINA did not respond to past 
or even current subordination. Rather, GINA was uniquely prophylactic, at-
tempting to head off a form of bias before it could really harm anyone. Taken 
together, GINA was a federal antidiscrimination statute that the average person 
knew nothing about. 
While genetic information continues to be a hot-button issue, very few 
Americans are aware of GINA’s protections. Another study conducted three 
years after GINA’s passage found that out of 295 respondents only twenty-six (a 
disappointing 8.8%) had heard of the law, and only ten (3.4%) understood the 
scope of its protections.
167
 In fact, a study after GINA went into effect found that 
out of 1,699 individuals, 60.5% were concerned about health-insurance discrim-
ination and 28.6% were concerned about employment discrimination based on 
genetic information.
168
 Unsurprisingly, 54.3% of people surveyed in that study 
had not even heard of GINA.
169 
The law has not performed much better with 
medical professionals. A survey of 401 physicians reported that 54.5% had no 
knowledge of GINA.
170
 A law cannot alleviate fears over genetic testing or ward 
 
166. Jeremy Gruber, The New Genetic Nondiscrimination Act—How It Came to Pass and What It Does, 
COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS 2 (2009), http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics
.org/pagedocuments/pgwogj2f3o.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CYU-Y4YB] (“GINA suffered in 
obscurity for a number of years as the result of a Republican led Congress that was hostile to 
adding additional restrictions on the insurance industry and employer communities.”); Roth-
stein, supra note 68, at 5 (“The Congressional deliberations for GINA were long and difficult. 
The original bill was introduced in 1995, and for many years, it did not look as if the bill would 
ever emerge from committee. Several of its provisions raised concerns for insurers, employers, 
and other stakeholders. After thirteen years, the controversial provisions were either deleted, 
revised, or clariﬁed.”). 
167. Ming-Yi Huang et al., Awareness of the US Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008: 
An Online Survey, 4 J. PHARMACEUTICAL HEALTH SERVS. RES. 235, 236 (2013). 
168. Dawn C. Allain et al., Consumer Awareness and Attitudes About Insurance Discrimination Post 
Enactment of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 11 FAMILIAL CANCER 637, 640 
(2012). 
169. Id. at 640-42. 
170. Amanda L. Laedtke et al., Family Physicians’ Awareness and Knowledge of the Genetic Information 
Non-Discrimination Act (GINA), 21 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 345, 348 (2012). 
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off discrimination if no one knows about it. As such, GINA may be long overdue 
for a public-awareness campaign. 
b. Limited Scope 
Another line of critique posits that, regardless of how many people know 
about the statute, GINA does not cover enough potentially discriminatory con-
duct. Some have pointed out that GINA limits its protections to health insurance 
and employment, leaving people susceptible to discrimination in life insurance, 
long-term-care insurance, disability insurance, education, housing, criminal in-
vestigations, and commercial transactions.
171
 At least two states, Illinois and Cal-
ifornia, have taken action to address this limited scope.
172
 For example, Califor-
nia passed a law to add genetic information as a protected class to its 
antidiscrimination law. Drafters of the state legislation, dubbed CalGINA, ex-
plained that they found GINA’s current scope “incomplete for Californians.”
173
 
This law expanded genetic-information protection to include housing, emer-
gency services, mortgage lending, and commercial transactions.
174
 
c. Narrow Protected Status 
Other criticisms of GINA’s reach center on its deﬁnitions of genetic infor-
mation and discrimination. Some scholars believe that potential discriminators, 
 
171. See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 68, at 5 (“GINA does not prohibit genetic discrimination in life 
insurance, disability insurance, long-term care insurance, mortgage insurance, educational 
opportunities, or commercial and real property transactions. A broader bill would have been 
extremely unlikely to get the necessary support in Congress.”); Mark A. Rothstein, Putting 
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act in Context, 10 GENETICS MED. 655, 655 (2008) 
[hereinafter Rothstein, Nondiscrimination Act in Context] (observing that GINA is seriously 
deﬁcient, in part because it does not apply to life insurance, disability insurance, long-term-
care insurance, or other uses of genetic information); Tenenbaum & Goodman, supra note 
161, at 154 (arguing that disability and long-term-care insurance are more like health insur-
ance than life insurance and should therefore be within GINA’s coverage); Zhang, supra note 
161 (criticizing GINA for not covering education or housing). 
172. See, e.g., Michael Bologna, Illinois Lawmakers Decide to Support Enhancements to Genetic Privacy 
Law, EMP. DISCRIMINATION REP. BNA No. 30 (June 25, 2008) (noting GINA prompted Illi-
nois to pass state legislation that expands the universe of covered employers and creates a 
“stiffer enforcement regimen”); Jennifer K. Wagner, A New Law to Raise GINA’s Floor in Cal-
ifornia, PRIVACY REP. (Dec. 7, 2011), https://theprivacyreport.com/2011/12/07/a-new-law-to 
-raise-ginas-ﬂoor-in-california [https://perma.cc/5ZHY-LSBP]. 
173. See CalGINA, ch. 261, § 1(j), 2011 Cal. Stat. 2774, 2776. 
174. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing protections provided by the California 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act). 
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particularly insurers, will be interested in epigenetic information.
175
 Yet at pre-
sent it is unclear whether GINA covers epigenetic markers, the microbiome, or 
myriad other kinds of biological information related to new technologies.
176
 
GINA’s failure to cover manifested conditions—even ones that are genetic in na-
ture—has been identiﬁed as another area of vulnerability, because the line be-
tween asymptomatic and manifested conditions is often not clear-cut.
177
 Finally, 
despite the inclusion of a privacy provision, GINA actually takes a relatively con-
servative approach to what constitutes discrimination. Other federal antidis-
crimination statutes cover unintentional discrimination and offer positive differ-
ential treatment, like accommodations and diversity initiatives. As noted, GINA 
fails to cover unintentional discrimination or to require positive action. 
GINA’s exceptions have also ensured a narrowly protected status. GINA ex-
pressly allows health insurers and employers to lawfully obtain genetic infor-
mation under certain circumstances, such as to conduct research,
178
 to provide 
wellness programs,
179
 to comply with medical-leave laws,
180
 and to monitor ex-
posure to toxic substances.
181
 These exceptions could create opportunities to dis-
criminate. Indeed, when members of Congress proposed a bill to expand well-
 
175. Epigenetic discrimination refers to the adverse treatment or abusive proﬁling of individuals 
based on external changes to genes that do not alter the underlying DNA sequence. For ex-
ample, epigenetic modiﬁcations occur in the body because of smoking. An employer with ac-
cess to this information may then decide not to hire that person. See Charles Dupras et al., 
Epigenetic Discrimination: Emerging Application of Epigenetics Pointing to the Limitations of Poli-
cies Against Genetic Discrimination, 9 FRONTIERS GENETICS 1 (2018) (describing the possibility 
of epigenetic discrimination); Riya R. Kanherkar et al., Epigenetics Across the Human Lifespan, 
2 FRONTIERS CELL & DEVELOPMENTAL BIO. 1, 11-12 (2014), https://www.frontiersin.org 
/articles/10.3389/fcell.2014.00049/full [https://perma.cc/CS3M-S2KP] (discussing the en-
vironmental impact of smoking on epigenetics). 
176. See Rothstein, supra note 68, at 6 (“The deﬁnition does not appear to cover epigenetic marks, 
microbiome data, or various other emerging biological measures. As a matter of science, 
GINA has been frozen in time for at least ten years, and it may be increasingly difficult to 
prove discrimination resulting from information developed by emerging technologies.”). 
177. See Roberts, supra note 61, at 637; Rothstein, supra note 68, at 6. (“The problem is that there 
is a large gap between these statutes, and some individuals may not be covered under either 
law. This would include individuals who have a biomarker of genome-environment interac-
tion, a subclinical marker of aberrant gene expression, or an initial symptom of a gene-asso-
ciated disease.”); Rothstein, Nondiscrimination Act in Context, supra note 171, at 655. 
178. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 101(c)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1182(c)(4) 
(2018). 
179. Id. § 202(b)(2)(A). 
180. Id. § 202(b)(3). 
181. Id. § 202(b)(5). 
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ness programs, some feared that these changes would undermine genetic privacy 
and lead to future discrimination.
182
 
2. GINA Is Unnecessary 
Beyond merely being ineffective, GINA has also faced criticism for being un-
necessary in the ﬁrst place. By all accounts, genetic discrimination was not hap-
pening on a widespread basis when Congress passed the law.
183
 Most of the ex-
amples in the legislative history were anecdotal,
184
 and there were no reported 
cases under the thirty-four state statutes that predated GINA.
185
 Thus, one op-




Additionally, even if we needed GINA’s health-insurance protections in 
2008, we arguably do not need them now. The ACA, passed two years after 
GINA, rendered moot some of GINA’s most central provisions.
187
 The ACA 
solved many of the problems GINA sought to address—and it did so for all med-
ically relevant information, not just genetic data.
188
 It banned preexisting condi-
tion exclusions, eliminated health-status-based rating in the individual and 
small group markets, and outlawed medical underwriting.
189
 After the ACA, 
health insurers could no longer deny coverage for preexisting conditions, set dis-
criminatory premiums, or make eligibility decisions based on any medically rel-
evant risk-related information, including genetic information. The ACA also 
regulates employer-provided wellness programs and prohibits insurance com-
panies from using wellness programs to rate the risks of its members.
190
 
Consequently, the ACA rendered several key provisions of Title I of GINA 
useless; but that is not to say Title I of GINA has no value in a post-ACA world. 
 
182. Hudson & Pollitz, supra note 161, at 1-2 (arguing that GINA’s wellness-program exceptions 
could be expanded to compromise genetic privacy). 
183. Roberts, supra note 13, at 470. 
184. See id. at 466-68. 
185. Kim, supra note 160, at 696. 
186. Protecting Workers from Genetic Discrimination: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Health, Em-
ployment, Labor & Pensions of the H. Comm. on Energy & Labor, 110th Cong. 45 (2007) (state-
ment of Burton J. Fishman, Counsel to the GINE Coalition). 
187. Rothstein, supra note 68, at 5 (asserting that “[t]he Affordable Care Act, enacted in 2010, 
prohibits discrimination based on health status, making Title I of GINA largely irrelevant”). 
188. Id. 
189. Jessica L. Roberts, “Healthism”: A Critique of the Antidiscrimination Approach to Health Insur-
ance and Health-Care Reform, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1159, 1187-88. 
190. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j) (2018). 
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For example, the law still prevents health insurers from asking for genetic-test 
results or family medical history. Of course, if Congress were to repeal the ACA 
or the Supreme Court were to revisit the statute’s constitutionality following the 
recent conservative shift of the Court’s composition, Title I of GINA would again 
have an important role to play. 
One could also advance the argument that GINA’s provisions are unneces-
sary based on data about the charges ﬁled. Beginning in 2010, the ﬁrst year that 
charges could realistically be ﬁled based upon the effective date of the statute, 
the number of charges rose each year for several years.
191
 The EEOC reported 
201 complaints of genetic discrimination in 2010, 245 complaints in 2011, 280 
complaints in 2012, and 333 complaints in both 2013 and 2014.
192
 This steady 
progression led at least one commentator to observe “a trend towards increased 
occurrences of genetic discrimination.”
193
 But the upward trend has now re-
shaped into a bell curve. There were only 257 complaints in 2015, 238 complaints 
in 2016, and 206 complaints in 2017—representing a return to the volume of 
charges ﬁled during the ﬁrst full year the statute was in effect.
194
 It is not clear 
exactly what is driving these statistics, but the EEOC’s own numbers do not sup-
port a narrative of increasing genetic discrimination. 
As explained above, Congress likely only included employment in GINA’s 
protections because so many Americans hold employer-provided health-insur-
ance policies. But in an interesting twist of fate, the employment title, which was 
perhaps somewhat of an afterthought, is now GINA’s most important protec-
tion. 
C. GINA as a Success 
While one might be tempted to judge GINA as a failure based on our case 
study, that would be a mistake. Even though claimants have not brought many 
successful claims for genetic discrimination, they have won—at least in the re-
ported cases—for violations of their privacy. A close study of these cases reveals 
that GINA has been interpreted broadly in the area of privacy. Thus, where 
GINA has not obviously been a robust bulwark against discrimination, it has 
succeeded in safeguarding sensitive information. 
 
191. Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2017, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OP-
PORTUNITY COMMISSION (2018) [hereinafter EEOC Change Statistics], https://www.eeoc.gov
/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc/Z9K3-C246]. 
192. Id. 
193. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Data and Civil Rights, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 75, 78 (2016). 
194. EEOC Change Statistics, supra note 191. 
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1. Court Interpretations of GINA as a Privacy Protection 
Courts have protected employee privacy broadly with respect to both ge-
netic-test results and family medical history. Perhaps the most notorious lawsuit 
in GINA’s ﬁrst ten years was Lowe v. Atlas Logistics, also known as the case of the 
“devious defecator.”
195
 When a company discovered that a disgruntled employee 
was defecating in its warehouse, the employer required two suspects to take ge-
netic tests to compare their results to the feces. Although the test results exoner-
ated the employees, they sued, obtaining a $2.2 million jury verdict. In a line of 
reasoning similar to Poore, the defendants invoked GINA’s legislative history to 
argue that the statute, which was designed with medical genetic testing in mind, 
should not cover forensic genetic testing. Following the plain language of the 
statute and Congress’s legislative intent,
196
 the court rejected this narrow con-
struction of genetic information, ﬁnding that GINA covers nonmedical genetic 
testing. The breadth of Lowe’s ﬁnding could provide a foundation for applying 
GINA to a wide variety of nonpredictive genetic testing, including forensics, pa-
ternity, and ancestry.
197
 In short, Lowe’s construction supports understanding 
GINA as a robust protection for employee privacy. 
Courts have been similarly generous in cases dealing with requests for family 
medical history. In Lee v. City of Moraine Fire Department, the city required ﬁre-
ﬁghters to undergo an annual health and wellness physical, which included a 
questionnaire that asked about family medical history of heart disease.
198
 When 
one ﬁreﬁghter refused the physical, the department ﬁred him for insubordina-
tion.
199
 He sued, alleging that the employer violated GINA by asking for his fam-
ily medical history. The court observed that “the text of GINA is clear” and that 
the department had plainly requested genetic information.
200
 The ﬁre depart-
 
195. Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Grp. Retail Servs., 102 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2015). 
196. Id. at 1367 (“It is not unreasonable for Congress to achieve this ‘national and uniform basic 
standard’ of full protection by broadly prohibiting employers from requesting, requiring, or 
purchasing genetic information of their employees, except under limited circumstances.”). 
197. For an example of a potential GINA ancestry claim, see Tim Marcin, White Michigan Cop Files 
Racism Lawsuit After Ancestry.com Revealed He’s Part Black, NEWSWEEK (May 10, 2017), http://
www.newsweek.com/white-cop-sues-michigan-city-racism-after-ancestrycom-revealed-hes
-part-black-607004 [https://perma.cc/8FNJ-REKL], which illustrates the discrimination 
one police officer experienced after revealing to his colleagues that he was partially black. 
198. No. 3:13-CV-222, 2015 WL 914440, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2015). 
199. Id. at *4-5. 
200. Id. at *11. 
gina, big data, and the future of employee privacy 
753 
ment countered that it was the doctor administering the physicals—not the de-
partment itself—that added the prohibited inquiry.
201
 The court quickly cited 
GINA’s deﬁnition of “employer,” which includes agents of the employer.
202
 It 
also quoted GINA’s regulations, which require employers to affirmatively in-
struct their health-care providers “not to collect genetic information, including 
family medical history, as part of a medical examination intended to determine 
the ability to perform a job.”
203
 After all, even though some genetic information 
may be necessary to positively diagnose a manifested disease or disorder, “there 
does not appear to be a case in which the diagnosis, as opposed to the signs and 




2. EEOC Interpretations of GINA as a Privacy Protection 
The EEOC has also embraced a vision of GINA as an employee-privacy stat-
ute by pursuing cases for requests for family medical history. In EEOC v. Grisham 
Farm Products, Inc., the employer required applicants to reveal whether they had 
consulted with any medical professionals in the last two years and to identify 
whether any future diagnostic testing had been discussed.
205
 The court observed 
that these questions “would require an applicant without the manifestation of, 
for example, high blood pressure, heart disease, or breast cancer, who has pre-
ventatively ‘consulted’ with a physician or been told by a physician to get diag-
nostic testing in light of their family medical history or risk factors, to reveal such 
information” to the employer.
206
 According to the court, this solicitation plainly 
violated GINA. 
The EEOC has also settled cases related to requests for family medical his-
tory. In EEOC v. Cummins Power Generation Inc., the employer sought family 
medical history in the course of a ﬁtness-for-duty assessment.
207
 While the de-
fendants attempted to argue that the third parties who drafted the medical re-
leases were indispensable parties to the litigation, the court maintained that the 
 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at *11-12. 
203. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(d) (2018)). 
204. Regulations Under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 
68912, 68927 (Nov. 9, 2010). 
205. 191 F. Supp. 3d 994, 998 (W.D. Mo. 2016). 
206. Id. 
207. 313 F.R.D. 93, 96 (D. Minn. 2015). 
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employer violated GINA, leading to a settlement agreement.
208
 EEOC v. Founders 
Pavilion, Inc. also resulted in a settlement related to an employer request for fam-
ily medical history in conjunction with postoffer medical exams.
209
 
GINA claims are adjudicated not only in courts, but also by the EEOC. While 
structural litigation by the EEOC has been characterized as typically achieving 
only “modest” or “managerialist” interventions,
210
 the EEOC’s settlements 
reached under GINA appear to be more ambitious. First, the EEOC has aggres-
sively pursued claims related to family medical histories.
211
 Second, the EEOC 
has also sought and recovered damages for requests for genetic information even 
where there is no corresponding claim of discrimination.
212
 Finally, the EEOC 
 
208. Id. at 101-03; EEOC v. Cummins Power Generation Inc., No. 14-CV-3408, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 184407 (D. Minn. May 6, 2016) (consent decree). 
209. No. 13-CV-6250, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81439 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2014). 
210. Margo Schlanger & Pauline Kim, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Struc-
tural Reform of the American Workplace, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1519, 1525-27 (2014). 
211. See BNV Home Care Agency to Pay $125,000 to Settle EEOC Genetic Discrimination Lawsuit, U.S. 
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc 
/newsroom/release/11-1-16a.cfm [https://perma.cc/73AV-RTAH] [hereinafter BNV Home 
Care Agency] (settling a matter in which a company impermissibly asked for family medical 
histories); Fabricut to Pay $50,000 to Settle EEOC Disability and Genetic Information Discrimina-
tion Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (May 7, 2013), https://www.eeoc
.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/5-7-13b.cfm [https://perma.cc/56MA-VTDD] (settling a mat-
ter in which a company impermissibly asked for its employee’s family medical history regard-
ing “heart disease, hypertension, cancer, tuberculosis, diabetes, arthritis and ‘mental disor-
ders’”); Guardsmark Settles EEOC Disability & Genetic Information Discrimination Cases for 
$329,640, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (June 23, 2016), https://www.eeoc
.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/6-23-16.cfm [https://perma.cc/LY3R-LRC7] (settling a matter 
in which a company required applicants to complete questionnaires with questions pertaining 
to their family medical history); Joy Mining Machinery Settles EEOC Genetic Information Non-
Discrimination Act Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Jan. 7, 2016), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-7-16.cfm [https://perma.cc/K4MT 
-QRMV] (settling a matter in which a company impermissibly asked applicants if they had a 
family medical history of “TB, Cancer, Diabetes, Epilepsy, [and] Heart Disease”). 
212. See Founders Pavilion Will Pay $370,000 to Settle EEOC Genetic Information Discrimination Law-
suit, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Jan. 13, 2014), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc
/newsroom/release/1-13-14.cfm [https://perma.cc/LAL2-96TY] [hereinafter Founders Pavil-
ion] (requiring a payment fund for people whose genetic information was improperly solic-
ited); Seed and Fertilizer Providers to Pay $187,500 for Genetic Information and Disability Discrim-
ination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.eeoc.gov
/eeoc/newsroom/release/11-10-14.cfm [https://perma.cc/K8YH-8TSX] (settling for nearly 
$200,000, the majority of which went to four applicants whose genetic information was im-
properly solicited) [hereinafter All Star Seed]; see also BNV Home Care Agency, supra note 211 
(“Employers should take heed of this settlement, because there are tangible consequences to 
unlawfully asking employees and applicants about their family medical history.”). 
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has more procedural latitude to aggregate claims than do private litigants,
213
 and 
it has recently had success in settling class actions under GINA.
214
 
Reading the favorable GINA cases together reveals that although GINA has 
not been used to defend against discrimination based on genetic-test results, it 
has provided employees relief when employers seek genetic data, particularly in 
the form of family medical history. Thus, GINA’s most valuable provisions have 
been secondary to its legislative purpose to increase genetic testing. The statute 
has thus succeeded in unexpected ways. 
i i i .  gina’s legacy 
Having reﬂected on GINA’s ﬁrst decade, we now turn to GINA’s future. As 
described above, GINA’s greatest observable contribution has been as a safe-
guard against employer prying. Robust protections for employee privacy are 
more important now than ever before, as employees are particularly vulnerable 
to employer snooping in a world of big data. At present, employees have little 
meaningful protection for their privacy at work. GINA therefore offers a unique 
and valuable protection. Although not conceived as a big-data privacy statute, 
GINA safeguards a rich source of information that employers could otherwise 
mine. 
GINA’s unexpected second life as a privacy statute both demonstrates the 
need for greater protections for employee privacy and provides a blueprint for 
structuring those protections. This Part begins by arguing that GINA provides 
novel protection against data mining in the workplace. It then turns to the ben-
eﬁts of enacting GINA-like protections for other forms of sensitive employee 
data. Finally, we reﬂect on the normative implications of our ﬁndings. 
A. Modern Privacy Landscape in a World of Big Data 
Many of the cases from Part II show that employers want access to their em-
ployees’ data. Read together, these lawsuits demonstrate that employers are in-
terested in employee data throughout the duration of the employment relation-
ship. They want access to information about their employees to make hiring  
 
213. Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 463-64 (2007) 
(observing that under various employment discrimination statutes “the EEOC and DOJ have 
far more procedural breathing room to pursue class-type relief than private litigants.”). 
214. See All Star Seed, supra note 212 (settling a matter on behalf of a class of job applicants who 
were subjected to illegal medical and genetic-information inquiries); BNV Home Care Agency, 
supra note 211 (same); Founders Pavilion, supra note 212 (settling ﬁrst-ever class action lawsuit 
alleging genetic discrimination). 
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decisions, assess ﬁtness for duty, improve wellness, decrease costs, and regulate 
employee conduct. 
1. Big Data and the Threat to Employee Privacy 
Here we outline why employers feel employee data is valuable, how big data 
compounds existing threats to privacy, and the ways in which employers could 
use big data to monitor their employees. 
a. The Value of Employee Data 
Consider the example of Humanyze from the Introduction. Employers have 
many reasons for wanting information about their employees. Most private em-
ployers care primarily about their bottom lines.
215
 They want to maximize 
productivity while minimizing costs, and workers can cost their employers 
money in a variety of ways. They may waste valuable work hours using social 
media sites, chatting with coworkers, taking smoke breaks, or browsing the in-
ternet. They may not come in at all for health reasons or to fulﬁll family obliga-
tions. They may raise insurance or operating costs because of illness or injury. 
As a result, employers may be very interested in learning which employees are 
distracted or feeling stressed, which employees plan to get pregnant, or which 
employees are susceptible to disease or injury—to name just a few possibilities. 
Additionally, tracking communication and movement can let an employer know 
if departments are not working together or if space is being underutilized.
216
 
Having access to this kind of information allows employers to make more in-
formed decisions about whom to hire, whom to ﬁre, and whom to promote to 
ensure a workforce that is as productive and low cost as possible. 
Importantly, the desired information need not have anything to do with the 
employee’s ability to perform the job. Take, for example, off-duty smoking. A 
potential employee may have excellent credentials, relevant experience, and 
highly developed skills. She may only smoke in the privacy of her home and her 
habit could have no meaningful impact on her ability to perform her job. Nev-
ertheless, some employers will not hire that candidate for reasons related to in-
surance costs or even animus.
217
 In these cases, whether an employee smokes has 
 
215. See Sharona Hoffman, Citizen Science: The Law and Ethics of Public Access to Medical Big Data, 
30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1741, 1774 (2015) (explaining that “[e]mployers go to great lengths to 
select employees carefully in order to maximize business productivity and proﬁtability.”). 
216. See There Will Be Little Privacy, supra note 1. 
217. See JESSICA L. ROBERTS & ELIZABETH WEEKS, HEALTHISM: HEALTH-STATUS DISCRIMINATION 
AND THE LAW 7, 33-34, 42, 115-16, 184 (2018). 
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nothing to do with qualiﬁcations, ability, or job performance. Thus, a wide range 
of private information—not just conduct or attributes that affect whether a per-
son can work—may be of interest to employers. 
b. Big Data as a Growing Threat to Privacy 
In the digital age, employees are particularly vulnerable to employer surveil-
lance. Certainly, the degree of employee surveillance by Humanyze is extreme, 
but even more conventional employers may wish to track their workers. Em-
ployers have a vested interest in monitoring the private lives of their employees, 




Employers have a variety of surveillance tools already at their disposal. First, 
employers can use productivity apps and software to monitor their workers. Em-
ployers can track when employees view a document, access the internet, read 
emails, and log on to social media.
219
 Second, employers can collect information 
on physical health and activity. Wellness programs may include biometric 
screenings, health-risk-assessment questionnaires, and ﬁtness-tracking devices 
like FitBits.
220
 Amazon recently patented wristbands for its employees that could 
track their locations and hand movements to allow the company to monitor its 
workers’ accuracy and productivity in real time.
221
 Finally, employers can obtain 
sensitive employee information like social media proﬁles and credit reports.
222
 
Employers today have potential access to an unprecedented amount of infor-
mation about their employees. 
If all these individual sources were not enough, big data compounds the 
threats to employee privacy. While there is no uniformly accepted deﬁnition of 
“big data,” it typically refers to a high-volume dataset that, although too large 
for traditional databases and analytical tools, can be analyzed using algorithms 
or other computational methods.
223
 One quality that makes big data unique is 
 
218. See Ajunwa et al., supra note 77, at 738 (arguing that advances in the ability to monitor em-
ployees have “moved in lockstep with the advancement of technological capacities”). 
219. See id. at 742-43, 769; There Will Be Little Privacy, supra note 1. 
220. See Ajunwa et al., supra note 77, at 763-66. 
221. There Will Be Little Privacy, supra note 1. 
222. Hoffman, supra note 215, at 1775 (“Many employers reportedly access public proﬁles that ap-
plicants post on social media sites as part of their investigation of candidates’ credentials. They 
also ask applicants for permission to obtain their credit reports.”). 
223. See The Big Data Conundrum: How to Deﬁne It?, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 3, 2013), https://www
.technologyreview.com/s/519851/the-big-data-conundrum-how-to-deﬁne-it [https://
perma.cc/F76S-VUUM] (discussing a survey of different deﬁnitions of “big data” provided 
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its ability to reveal trends, patterns, and relationships that would go unnoticed 
using more conventional models.
224
 It provides the opportunity to cross-refer-
ence datasets and to access even more intimate information. In a particularly 
provocative and unsettling example of what big data can achieve, the Target Cor-
poration famously revealed that a teenager was pregnant before she told her par-
ents.
225
 An angry man stormed into the retailer demanding to know why Target 
had started sending mailers featuring baby clothes and cribs to his high-school-
age daughter. It turned out that the corporation had accurately predicted the 
young woman might be expecting a child, using data analytics to identify pur-
chasing patterns of the women on its baby registries. Target learned that preg-
nant women buy certain products, like supplements and unscented lotion, at 
varying points in their pregnancies. The corporation had taken the algorithms it 
developed based on those patterns and applied them to its database of custom-
ers.
226
 In fact, Target could have even told the outraged father his daughter’s 
approximate due date.
227
 Big-data analysis means that what seems like a simple 
visit to Target can reveal intimate information about a person’s reproductive 
choices—information she may not yet have shared with her family and friends. 
In another example of big data revealing intimate information, a recent study 
reported that social media giant Facebook—which recently came under attack for 
its lax privacy protections
228
—can infer a user’s sexual orientation, even if she 
has not openly disclosed that orientation on her proﬁle.
229
 The algorithm uses 
 
by high-tech organizations); see also, e.g., Big Data, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 
2008) (“[D]ata of a very large size, typically to the extent that its manipulation and manage-
ment present signiﬁcant logistical challenges . . . .”); James Manyika et al., Big Data: The Next 




(“[D]atasets whose size is beyond the ability of typical database software tools to capture, 
store, manage, and analyze.”). 
224. See Dalim Basu & Jon G. Hall, Big Data, Big Opportunities, in BIG DATA: OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CHALLENGES 46, 48-51 (2014). 





228. See Class Action Complaint at 3-4, Price v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:18-CV-01732, 2018 WL 
1404892 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2018) (alleging that Facebook permitted Cambridge Analytica to 
gather personal information about its members without their permission). 
229. See Daizhuo Chen et al., Enhancing Transparency and Control When Drawing Data-Driven In-
ferences About Individuals, 5 BIG DATA 197, 198, 203 (2017). 
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“Likes” for certain activities, musical artists, books and TV shows—dancing, 
Katy Perry, Harry Potter, and True Blood, for example—to predict whether the 
user might identify as LGBTQ. Facebook could then sell that information to ad-
vertisers who want to reach LGBTQ users. 
In the same way that Facebook “Likes” can predict sexual orientation, big 
data can also be used to predict divorce and insurance risk. Using credit card 
purchase data, companies like Visa can forecast divorce rates. These predictions 
in turn allow them to determine future potential credit problems, as people go-
ing through a divorce are more likely to miss payments.
230
 Insurers likewise use 
big data to gain additional information about their insureds, such as using credit 
scores to infer risk.
231
 
c. Big Data in Employment 
Employers are capable of harnessing the power of big data. They can hire 
data miners to aggregate and analyze information beyond what they learn from 
productivity apps, wellness data, and requests for information to gain a peek into 
the private lives of their employees.
232
 Employers are already gathering infor-
mation about their employees that they could then use to proﬁle and ﬂag poten-
tially costly or otherwise undesirable workers.
233
 For example, Microsoft has a 
program that analyzes data from emails, calendars, and other sources to allow 
employees to assess whether they are using their time efficiently.
234
 Managers 
also have access to that information but only in aggregated form.
235
 
The potential information available to employers about their workers is not 
conﬁned to the workplace. Employers could take the information that they al-
ready have and gain additional insights about employees’ health, reproductive  
 
 
230. See IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY TO BE 
SMART 34, 179 (2007) (describing the allegation that Visa uses credit card purchases to predict 
divorce). 
231. Darcy Steeg Morris et al., Do Credit-Based Insurance Scores Proxy for Income in Predicting Auto 
Claim Risk?, 14 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 397 (2017). 
232. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 215, at 1775 (“It is also possible that employers will hire data 
miners to re-identify medical information when doing so is not excessively difficult.”). 
233. See Sharona Hoffman, Big Data and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 
777 (2017) (arguing that employers can gather “[i]nformation about workers’ habits, behav-
iors, or attributes that is derived from big data” and that such information “can be used to 
create proﬁles of undesirable employees”). 
234. There Will Be Little Privacy, supra note 1. 
235. Id. 
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choices, relationships, and other aspects of their private lives by using big data. 
For example, health-care-analytics company Castlight made headlines in 2016 
when it advertised services including being able to predict whether employees 
were pregnant or trying to conceive.
236
 The algorithm uses factors like a female 
employee’s age, whether she has stopped ﬁlling a birth control prescription, and 
any fertility-related queries on her health application to determine the likelihood 
she may have a baby.
237
 Thankfully, Castlight stated that it would return aggre-
gated (not individualized) data to its clients, share only the number of employees 
without their names, and not provide information about a group of fewer than 
forty people.
238
 But these restrictions are company-imposed policy designed to 
protect privacy and its public image. No law prevents Castlight from giving the 
names of potentially pregnant employees to its clients.
239
 
Pregnancy is not the only intimate kind of information that might be re-
vealed if employers use big data to pry. Say an employee has a family medical 
history of Huntington’s disease, a debilitating neurological condition that may 
come on at middle age, and her employer contracts with a health insurer that 
offers big-data analytics as part of its services. To search for providers covered 
by the health insurer, employees must log on with their names and policy infor-
mation. The website then keeps a record of their searches. If, when the employee 
starts experiencing the early warning signs of Huntington’s, the employee logs 
on to look for neurologists, the data-analytics ﬁrm could easily take her family 
medical history and cross-reference it with her age and web searches to deter-
mine that she has active Huntington’s disease. In fact, the employer might know 
that the employee is sick even before she herself knows. While health plans do 
not currently offer such services to employers, the Castlight example demon-
strates that this kind of data mining is certainly possible. 
Beyond physical health, employers can also peer into their employees’ sense 
of well-being and interpersonal relationships. In Japan, keeping employees 
happy and productive is a serious area of concern for employers.
240
 One Japanese  
 
 
236. Valentina Zarya, Employers Are Quietly Using Big Data to Track Employee Pregnancies, FORTUNE 
(Feb. 17, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/02/17/castlight-pregnancy-data [https://perma.cc
/E7Y2-JBK3]. 
237. Lindsey J. Smith, Big Data Knows if You’re Pregnant, VERGE (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www 
.theverge.com/2016/2/17/11032606/big-data-employers-health-info [https://perma.cc
/9EDX-Z57D]. 
238. Zarya, supra note 236. 
239. Id. 
240. See There Will Be Little Privacy, supra note 1. 
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company, Hitachi, markets a “happiness meter” to employers that uses an algo-
rithm to assess its employees’ moods based on their physical movement.
241
 An 
American ﬁrm, Veriato, offers a service that, among other things, scans emails to 
determine how employees’ feelings are changing over time.
242
 Additionally, an 
employer with access to its employees’ social media proﬁles, emails, internet 
searches, and ﬁnancial histories could—in the spirit of Facebook and creditors—
learn about their intimate interpersonal relationships. For example, divorce is 
one of life’s most notoriously disruptive events.
243
 An employer might thus be 
interested in learning if its employees’ marriages are on the rocks because that 
added stress could very well affect job performance. 
2. Non-GINA Protections for Employee Privacy 
While much of this conduct goes unregulated,
244
 employers do not have un-
fettered access to employee information. In particular, privacy statutes and laws 
governing disability restrict access to certain kinds of employee information.
245
 
a. Workplace Privacy Law 
Certain statutes directly protect employees from invasions of privacy. While 
there is no federal law that broadly shields workers from snooping by their em-
ployers, the Privacy Act of 1974 regulates how federal agencies and their contrac-
tors collect, maintain, use, and disseminate information about individuals, in-
cluding when the covered entities are acting as employers.
246




243. Thomas H. Holmes & Richard H. Rahe, The Social Readjustment Rating Scale, 11 J. PSYCHOSO-
MATIC RES. 213, 216 (1967). 
244. See Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1138 (2015) (arguing that “[s]en-
sitive information laws can and should do more work”); see also There Will Be Little Privacy, 
supra note 1 (explaining that “[m]ost employment contracts in America give employers blan-
ket rights to monitor employees and collect data about them”). 
245. See Hoffman, supra note 215, at 1774 (“Employers may have good economic reasons to strive 
for the healthiest possible workforce, but they are constrained by federal and state laws pro-
hibiting discrimination based on a variety of protected classiﬁcations, including disability and 
genetic information.”). 
246. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018); see also Workplace Monitoring Laws, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE 
MGMT., https://www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/hr-topics/employee-relations 
/Documents/State%20surveillance%20and%20monitoring%20laws.pdf [https://perma.cc
/BRE6-HUG6] (listing state statutes that regulate employers’ monitoring of their employ-
ees). 
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Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) prevents eavesdropping by employers 
when there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.
247
 However, two key excep-
tions limit the reach of that statute. The law permits employer monitoring in the 
ordinary course of business
248
 and with the employee’s consent.
249
 Hence, scour-
ing emails in the name of productivity—especially if employees have agreed to 
monitoring as a term of their employment—would not violate the statute. In 
fact, the consent exception does not require that the communication being mon-
itored relate to employment.
250
 Further, most employer monitoring of emails 
will not meet the ECPA’s deﬁnition of “intercept,” which requires that the sur-
veillance occur at the actual time that the email is sent.
251
 Federal law, therefore, 
enables employers to read their employees’ personal emails, as long as the em-
ployers obtain the requisite consent, or they access the email on a server after 
transmission. Most states also have laws that prohibit eavesdropping and secret 
recordings, which may apply to employers.
252
 Of course, much like with the 
ECPA, an employer will not violate most of these laws as long as it conducts 
surveillance by means of a server or the employee knows that she is under sur-
veillance. 
Certain states have enacted laws protecting employee privacy with respect to 
social media and biometric screening. Social media privacy statutes prevent em-
ployers from requiring their employees or applicants to provide passwords to 
their private online accounts.
253
 Additionally, at least three states—Illinois, 
Texas, and Washington—have passed laws governing the collection, use, and 
 
247. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511 (2018) (prohibiting the interception of a person’s communications 
but providing a defense for consent, under which no reasonable expectation of privacy would 
exist). 
248. Id. § 2510(5)(a). 
249. Id. § 2511(2)(d). 
250. See Managing Workplace Monitoring and Surveillance, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Feb. 
18, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/toolkits/pages
/workplaceprivacy.aspx. 
251. See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that “every 
circuit court to have considered the matter has held that an ‘intercept’ under the ECPA must 
occur contemporaneously with transmission” and thus, there can be no “intercept” of an email 
in storage). 
252. See Workplace Monitoring Laws, supra note 246. 
253. See State Social Media Privacy Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2, 2018), http://www
.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-laws-prohibiting
-access-to-social-media-usernames-and-passwords.aspx [https://perma.cc/ST6A-A9YN]. 
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storage of biometric data of consumers, as well as employees.
254
 The Illinois stat-
ute, which includes a private right of action, has resulted in a stream of litigation 
with more than ﬁfty companies having faced lawsuits as of 2018.
255
 The other 
two laws do not allow individuals to sue.
256
 Still, employers may monitor their 
employees’ internet use at work, including their use of social media during work 
hours. 
Finally, state statutes, many of which predate GINA, safeguard workers’ ge-
netic privacy.
257
 Almost three-quarters of states have genetic-speciﬁc employ-
ment protections and over half of states prohibit employers from requiring that 
their employees submit to genetic testing.
258
 These statutes have had an ex-




b. Americans with Disabilities Act 
The ADA offers some limited protection against employer snooping related 
to disability. What an employer can lawfully ask an employee depends on when 
that inquiry takes place: preoffer, postoffer, or during employment. Preoffer, a 
covered employer may ask applicants about their ability to perform job-related 
functions but it cannot make disability-related inquiries or request medical ex-
ams.
260
 Postoffer, not only can the employer require that prospective employees 
undergo medical exams, it can also request their health records, so long as it does 
not target individual employees, keeps the information conﬁdential, and does 
not use the data to discriminate on the basis of disability.
261
 Finally, after em-
 
254. Erin Marine, Biometric Privacy Laws: Illinois and the Fight Against Intrusive Tech, FORDHAM J. 




256. Paul Shukovsky, Washington Biometric Privacy Law Lacks Teeth of Illinois Cousin, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS (July 18, 2017), https://www.bna.com/washington-biometric-privacy-n73014461920 
[https://perma.cc/ECA8-39HJ]. 
257. Rothstein, supra note 30, at 175. 
258. See Bloomberg Law, State Chart on Genetic Information Bias in Employment (unpublished 
data) (on ﬁle with authors). 
259. Kim, supra note 160, at 696. 
260. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) (2018). 
261. Id. § 12112(d)(3) (“A covered entity may require a medical examination after an offer of em-
ployment has been made to a job applicant and prior to the commencement of the employ-
ment duties of such applicant, and may condition an offer of employment on the results of 
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ployment has begun, employers can only order medical exams or make disabil-
ity-related inquiries when the information sought is “job-related and consistent 
with business necessity.”
262
 Of course, in the age of big data, when employers 
can access information through a variety of sources other than medical examina-
tions and inquiries, the ADA’s privacy protections look obsolete.
263
 
B. GINA as a Blueprint for Employee-Privacy Protection 
We now turn to GINA’s unique contributions and to its shortcomings. The 
statute’s greatest success has been in barring employers from accessing certain 
kinds of sensitive information. This is privacy by design.
264
 However, the desire 
for employee data is not restricted to genetic information. As noted, employers 
may also have an interest in information about health risks, relationships, or 
even reproductive choices. As such, GINA’s success as a protection for employee 
privacy can serve as a blueprint for additional protections both for recognized 
antidiscrimination classes and for other sensitive employee data. 
1. Genetic-Information Nondiscrimination 
Given that current workplace privacy laws and the ADA leave workers largely 
unprotected from employer surveillance, GINA is far more promising as a pro-
tection for employee privacy. Its prohibition on obtaining genetic information 
helpfully prevents employers from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic-
test results of both employees and their family members. The hypothetical ex-
ample of the employee with Huntington’s disease demonstrates that genetic data 





such examination, if – (A) all entering employees are subjected to such an examination re-
gardless of disability; (B) information obtained regarding the medical condition or history of 
the applicant is . . . treated as a conﬁdential medical record . . . .”). 
262. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(A).  
263. For an excellent discussion of the ADA’s shortfalls when it comes to big data, see Hoffman, 
supra note 233, at 786-88. 
264. Cf. WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT (2018) (arguing that privacy is best effectu-
ated through improving the design of popular technologies). 
265. See Rothstein, supra note 68, at 6 (“Precision medicine promises to utilize genomic data in 
combination with diverse ‘big data’ sources, such as data from exposures, mobile devices and 
health apps, wearable devices, consumer transactions, geolocation logs, and numerous other 
publicly and privately available data sources. Computer algorithms will then calculate health 
risks or other end points.”). 
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Of course, as noted in Part II, GINA does not forbid all acquisitions of ge-
netic information.
266
 The wellness-program and toxic-monitoring provisions, in 
particular, may give employers further access to employee data that they can then 
mine. However, the statute limits the conditions under which employers can ac-
quire genetic information. Both exceptions require that the employee give “prior, 
knowing, voluntary, and written authorization”
267
 and that the employer only 
receives the genetic information “in aggregate terms that do not disclose the 
identity of speciﬁc employees.”
268
 Thus, GINA restricts substantially the condi-
tions under which employers can lawfully obtain their employees’ genetic data. 
Importantly, none of the reasons an employer might desire to mine data 
about its employees appears to fall within GINA’s exceptions. Actively acquiring 
genetic data to mine is not inadvertent. It does not relate to providing health 
services, applying for leave, monitoring toxic substances, or quality control in 
law enforcement. The most likely candidate for an applicable exception is pur-
chasing commercially and publicly available documents, yet even that provision 
seems unlikely to shield snoopy employers from liability. The exception states 
that an employer does not unlawfully obtain genetic information “where an em-
ployer purchases documents that are commercially and publicly available (in-
cluding newspapers, magazines, periodicals, and books, but not including med-
ical databases or court records) that include family medical history.”
269
 Thus, the 
exception appears to apply only to documents that inadvertently contain genetic 
information. None of GINA’s exceptions appears to provide employers with a 
pathway for obtaining genetic data. 
Consider the Huntington’s example. A third party has access to an em-
ployee’s family medical history as part of the datasets that it cross-references to 
gain predictive information, which it then passes to the employer. In such a sce-
nario, the employer could incur legal liability under GINA if it pays a data-ana-
lytics company to mine its employees’ data, because the employer is effectively 
purchasing genetic information as part of the company’s services.
270
 Of course, 
the data-analytics ﬁrm could redact all genetic information from its reports to 
 
266. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (detailing exceptions). 
267. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 202(b)(5)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 
(b)(5)(B)(i) (2018). However, if federal or state law requires the genetic monitoring, the em-
ployer does not need authorization. Id. § 202(b)(5)(B)(ii). 
268. Id. § 202(b)(2)(D), (b)(5)(E). 
269. Id. § 202(b)(4). 
270. Cf. Lee v. City of Moraine Fire Dep’t, No. 3:13-CV-222, 2015 WL 914440, at *11-12 (S.D. Ohio 
Mar. 3, 2015) (ﬁnding an employer liable under GINA for the behavior of a physician who was 
said to be an “agent” of the employer). 
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ensure that its clients do not run afoul of the statute. But depending on the na-
ture of the predictive information that the company discloses, employers pur-
chasing even redacted reports might violate GINA. The results of the data ana-
lytics—while not technically genetic information under the statute—may pertain 
to genetic risk and are thus only a small step removed from the letter of the law. 
GINA could possibly offer protection in the future against the acquisition and 
subsequent mining of genetic data.
271
 
2. Lessons from GINA’s First Ten Years 
One starting point for thinking about GINA as a blueprint for other privacy 
protections is to consider GINA’s shortcomings to date—and what, if anything, 
might be done about them. Reﬂecting on GINA’s ﬁrst decade provides the op-
portunity to reassess some of the criticisms of the statute’s usefulness. Drawing 
from our case review in Part II, we offer some prescriptive insights regarding 
how courts and other policy stakeholders should proceed on GINA. 
a. Lack of Awareness 
Given the lack of awareness about GINA, there must be a greater focus on 
educating the public. The EEOC and Department of Health and Human Services 
should implement a dedicated public-relations campaign to educate the public 
about GINA’s varied protections. More sweeping judicial interpretations or 
amendments will matter little if the general public does not know about the stat-
ute. 
 
271. Other discrimination laws have been interpreted over time to broaden the scope of the pro-
tected trait. This is especially the case when the broadening promotes the spirit or values of 
an underlying law. Perhaps the best example is Title VII’s protection of “sex,” which has been 
broadened over the decades to encompass gender nonconformance, sexual stereotyping, and 
transgender status. See KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, GENDER NONCONFORMITY AND THE LAW 
(2016) (discussing the evolution of U.S. sex discrimination jurisprudence during the twenty-
ﬁrst century); Bradley A. Areheart, The Symmetry Principle, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1085, 1087-88 
(2017). More recently, some courts have even found that gay and lesbian individuals may be 
per se covered under “sex”—and not just when they tie discrimination to their performative 
deﬁance of gender norms. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en 
banc); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). In much the 
same way, interpreting GINA broadly to address data analytics that pertain to genetic risk 
might be seen as furthering two of the law’s values: (1) the prevention of an underclass and 
(2) privacy. 
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There is also a need for public education about the nature of genomic risk,
272
 
which is a pronounced concern as more commercial DNA tests are coming to 
market. For example, take the recent FDA-approved DNA test for 
BRCA1/BRCA2 genetic mutations. Merely testing positive for one of several 
BRCA1/BRCA2 breast-cancer gene mutations does not provide deﬁnitive infor-
mation about the risk of developing breast cancer, and “most BRCA mutations 
that increase an individual’s risk are not detected by this [new direct-to-con-
sumer] test.”
273
 Further, “most cases of cancer are not caused by hereditary gene 
mutations but are thought to be caused by a wide variety of factors, including 
smoking, obesity, hormone use and other lifestyle issues.”
274
 All of this means 
that even something as seemingly straightforward as testing for breast-cancer 
gene mutations can contain many complications and uncertainties in forecasting 
risk. 
Ensuring that potential litigants, health-care providers, employers, the em-
ployment bar, and the judiciary have at least some familiarity with GINA and its 
protections, as well as with genetic risk in general, is essential for GINA’s future. 
Health-care providers and employers must understand the law to comply with 
it. Lawyers and the public should be able to identify potential GINA violations 
when they arise to bring cases. Judges must properly apply the statute, and not 
read in their own meaning. All of these things require greater awareness. 
b. Limited Scope 
As discussed above, GINA has also faced criticism for its limited scope. Em-
ployers and health insurers are not the only ones who may have an interest in 
obtaining and acting on genetic data. One can imagine the common fact patterns 
from the GINA cases playing out in other settings. For example, the case of the 
devious defecator could well have occurred at a public middle school. In many 
states, nothing would stop the school district from requiring minors to provide 
genetic data. Perhaps, then, we should think more broadly about other threats 
and expand GINA’s scope. While augmenting GINA’s reach might be a com-
mendable goal, expanding the statute to other spheres is unlikely to garner the 
requisite congressional support. GINA took thirteen years to pass and was the 
 
272. Mark A. Rothstein, Legal Conceptions of Equality in the Genomic Age, 25 LAW & INEQ. 429 
(2007). 
273. FDA Authorizes, with Special Controls, Direct-to-Consumer Test that Reports Three Mutations in 
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result of compromise on the part of lawmakers to appease various stakeholders, 
including researchers, employers, the insurance industry, and individuals at ge-
netic risk.
275
 In the current climate of political divisiveness, common ground is 
even harder to come by.
276
 Thus, any expansion beyond GINA’s current purview 




c. Narrow Protected Status 
Another source of criticism, which our case study bears out, has been GINA’s 
narrow protected status. Although family medical history has been interpreted 
robustly and represents a broadly remedial edge to GINA’s protections,
278
 some 
courts have already begun interpreting genetic information stringently—a move 
that has parallels in protected class gatekeeping, which scholars have observed at 
times under all of the employment discrimination statutes.
279
 While the deﬁni-
tion of genetic information is incredibly speciﬁc, courts should interpret its 
meaning broadly. 
As explained in Part II, Poore and Conner-Goodgame require that genetic in-
formation be predictive or communicate actual medical risk.
280
 This narrow ap-
plication—for example, to exclude allegations of discrimination that stem from 
an employee’s wife’s MS or a mother’s HIV—is needlessly restrictive. If the em-
ployer discriminated because it thought a wife’s MS or a mother’s HIV might 
relate to an employee’s health—even if the employer is mistaken—GINA ought 
to provide recourse. This argument is akin to the ADA’s protections, which de-
 
275. Rothstein, supra note 68, at 5 (explaining that GINA itself was a compromise because “[a] 
broader bill would have been extremely unlikely to get the necessary support in Congress”). 
276. Carl Hulse, Sharper State Divide in Congress Seen as ‘New Civil War,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/us/politics/hulse-congress-tax-cut-campaigns.html 
[https://perma.cc/L2A5-4226]. 
277. Rothstein, supra note 68, at 5 (“Although there has been some movement at the state level, 
notably California’s adding genetic information to the prohibitions of the state civil rights 
laws, the prospect of future Congressional action seems remote.”). 
278. See supra Section II.C (discussing the success of GINA as a privacy protection). 
279. See Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 101 (2017) (arguing 
that “protected class gatekeeping is grounded in dubious constructions of antidiscrimination 
statutes, and that its routine use prevents equality law from achieving its central aim: disman-
tling sexism, racism, homophobia, religious intolerance, and other such biases”); see also, e.g., 
Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn’t “Just Right”: The Entrenchment of the Medical Model 
of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181, 209-25 (2008) (detailing a variety of 
ways in which federal courts keep ADA plaintiffs out of court). 
280. Supra notes 119-126 and accompanying text. 
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ﬁne the protected class to include those who are “regarded as” disabled.
281
 The 
argument to protect information that does not communicate actual risk is also 
supported by the EEOC’s regulations, which deﬁne family members to include 
dependents by marriage and adoption.
282
 Such an expansive interpretation 
would also answer the call of scholars who have observed the ADA’s deﬁciencies 
in failing to protect people who are perceived as likely to develop mental or phys-
ical impairments in the future.
283
 Of course, if an employee can no longer ade-
quately perform her job, it would not be discrimination under either statute for 
the employer to take an adverse action. 
Further, protecting the plaintiffs in Poore and Conner-Goodgame is sensible 
from the perspective of giving plaintiffs associational protections that relate to 
genetic information. Courts have allowed both Title VII and ADA plaintiffs to 
bring claims based on their association with members of the protected class.
284
 
The same logic could be applied to the genetic context as well. In sum, genetic 
information should be interpreted by courts in a way that captures the spirit of 
GINA. Much like the court declared in Lowe v. Atlas Logistics, genetic information 
ought to be given a plain, nontechnical meaning that confers a broadly remedial 
impact.
285
 Such an interpretation would lay the groundwork to ﬂexibly apply 
GINA to areas of innovation, such as big data, as well as other areas that have 
not yet arisen. 
3. Taking a Cue from GINA 
A broad employee-privacy statute presents several challenges for lawmakers. 
First and foremost, what should be the scope of such a protection? GINA’s po-
tential as a blueprint for a big-data privacy statute can be understood in at least 
two different ways. On one hand, the ban on requesting, requiring, and purchas-
 
281. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(c) (2018). 
282. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(a)(1) (2018). 
283. Professor Sharona Hoffman has argued that, in the era of big data, Congress should amend 
the ADA “to protect individuals who might be categorized as likely to develop physical or 
mental impairments in the future.” Hoffman, supra note 233, at 777. 
284. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (deﬁning discrimination to include “excluding or otherwise 
denying equal jobs or beneﬁts to a qualiﬁed individual because of the known disability of an 
individual with whom the qualiﬁed individual is known to have a relationship or associa-
tion”); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892-93 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that discrimination because of an interracial marriage or interracial association was 
discrimination based on race); Barker v. Int’l Paper Co., 993 F. Supp. 10, 15-16 (D. Me. 1998) 
(holding that a nondisabled employee set forth an ADA retaliation claim by claiming he was 
ﬁred for seeking accommodation for his disabled wife). 
285. 102 F. Supp. 3d 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2015). 
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ing genetic data is a prohibition on collecting information that relates to a rec-
ognized antidiscrimination category—genetic information. On the other, 
GINA’s privacy provision restricts access to a particular type of private health 
information. Both readings could provide a model for future lawmaking. 
a. Protecting Recognized Antidiscrimination Classes 
While federal employment discrimination law prohibits discrimination 
based on race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, religion, age, disability, and genetic 
information, GINA is the only statute to broadly ban requesting, requiring, or 
purchasing information related to the protected status. Thus, these other pro-
tected statuses are more vulnerable to employer prying, particularly in the era of 
big data. We can return to the pregnancy example. The Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act (PDA) amends Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to outlaw discrimination 
against pregnant workers. However, nothing in that law stops employers from 
requesting, requiring, or purchasing information about their employees’ poten-
tial pregnancies. Likewise, the ADA does not stop employers from obtaining in-
formation related to disability, so long as the employers are not conducting med-
ical exams or making disability-related inquiries. Employers could therefore use 
big data to legally obtain all kinds of sensitive information about their employ-
ees, even information that relates to statuses protected by employment discrim-
ination laws. 
Taking a cue from GINA, Congress or states could pass laws that similarly 
prohibit employers from requesting, requiring, or purchasing employee infor-
mation that pertains to a protected antidiscrimination category. For example, 
lawmakers could amend Title VII and the ADA to include GINA-like privacy 
provisions. Those amendments would prevent employers from requesting, re-
quiring, or purchasing information related to a protected status. These protec-
tions would, by consequence, prohibit employers from mining that data. 
Adding GINA-like privacy protections could also serve the antidiscrimina-
tion goals of those preexisting laws. Employers who mine data in an attempt to 
reduce costs may further disadvantage historically subordinated groups. Con-
sider again the pregnancy example. Once an employer knows that at least forty 
of its employees are pregnant or trying, all women of reproductive age may be-
come suspect.
286
 The employer may then—either consciously or because of im-
plicit bias—opt not to hire or promote women of reproductive age out of the 
 
286. Stephanie R. Morain et al., What to Expect When [Your Employer Suspects] You’re Expecting, 
176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1597, 1597-98 (2016). 
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concern that they may impose costs by ﬁling insurance claims and taking paren-
tal leave,
287
 thus further disadvantaging a historically subjugated group. This 
conduct would, of course, violate the PDA. However, discrimination, particu-
larly when it results from unconscious thinking, is notoriously hard to estab-
lish.
288
 Preventing employers from acquiring information that relates to a pro-
tected status could deny employers access to the very information they would, 
and do, use to discriminate.
289
 Thus, amending existing employment discrimi-
nation statutes to safeguard privacy also serves those laws’ antidiscrimination 
ends. 
b. Protecting Sensitive Information 
While amending existing antidiscrimination laws is one path forward, em-
ployers want intimate information that falls outside the scope of those laws. Ex-







 or socioeconomic class.
293
 Alternatively, instead of 
 
287. Id. at 1598. 
288. As the Seventh Circuit stated decades ago, “Proof of . . . discrimination is always difficult. 
Defendants of even minimal sophistication will neither admit discriminatory animus nor 
leave a paper trail demonstrating it; and because most employment decisions involve some 
discretion, alternative hypotheses (including that of simple mistake) will always be possible 
and often plausible.” Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987). Studies have 
shown that employment discrimination plaintiffs have lower success rates than plaintiffs in 
other domains when it comes to settlement, pretrial adjudication, and trial. Kevin M. Cler-
mont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to 
Worse, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 131 (2009). 
289. Roberts, supra note 28, at 2121-22. 
290. While formally there is no federal statutory protection for sexual orientation, many states and 
municipalities prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. See State Laws on Employ-
ment-Related Discrimination, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research
/labor-and-employment/discrimination-employment.aspx [https://perma.cc/EV44-A8QS]. 
Additionally, two federal circuit courts have recently held that gay and lesbian individuals are 
always covered under “sex”—and not just when they tie discrimination to their performative 
deﬁance of gender norms. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en 
banc); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Nevertheless, 
most circuit courts have held that sexual orientation is not covered under Title VII’s prohibi-
tion of “sex” discrimination. 
291. While public employers may not discriminate based on political affiliation, private employers 
are generally not subject to the same kinds of constraints. See 10 LEX. K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION ch. 171 (2d ed. 2011). 
292. See generally ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 217. 
293. While there is no general protection against socioeconomic-status discrimination, a few laws 
have been passed at the state level to ban discrimination against those with poor credit. 
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looking to antidiscrimination statutes and historically subordinated groups, leg-
islators could regulate employers’ access to different sorts of information. GINA 
is unlike other antidiscrimination statutes because the status it protects is not a 
widely accepted, lived social category.
294
 GINA can therefore be understood not 
as protecting an attribute or a class of people but rather as protecting certain 
kinds of information, mainly genetic-test results and family medical history. 
Thus, another way to structure a GINA-like protection for employee privacy 
would be to forbid access to certain kinds of employee data. 
The beneﬁt of this model would extend beyond traditional antidiscrimina-
tion categories to provide more comprehensive protection for all employees. It 
would not matter if the data mining pertains to a protected status, just that it 
involves potentially sensitive information. For instance, whether Title VII for-
bids discrimination because of sexual orientation is an unresolved question.
295
 
Amending Title VII to protect sexual orientation as a recognized class might still 
allow employers to use data analytics to acquire that information. However, if 
the law forbids access to social media proﬁles and browser histories, the em-
ployer could not derive inferences about an employee’s sexuality from social me-
dia regardless of how courts resolve the question of whether Title VII protects 
sexual orientation. This strategy has the added beneﬁt of avoiding identity poli-
tics and protected class gatekeeping,
296
 while also subverting the potential for 
discrimination. 
Legislators could deﬁne the parameters of an employee-privacy statute in at 
least a couple different ways. First, they could limit employer access to certain 
types of data. Protected categories might include information that pertains to rec-
ognized zones of privacy (including medical treatment and intimate relation-
ships). Such a legal protection would require creating an enumerated list, thus 
leaving information not captured in those categories unprotected. Another strat-
 
Heather Morton, Use of Credit Information in Employment: 2015 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (June 2, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ﬁnancial-services-and 
-commerce/use-of-credit-information-in-employment-2015-legislation.aspx [https://
perma.cc/T2PX-FPYU] (documenting the states that have introduced or passed legislation 
barring the use of credit information in hiring). Nevertheless, a compelling case can be made 
for extending the discrimination laws to socioeconomic-status discrimination. See Danieli 
Evans Peterman, Socioeconomic Status Discrimination, 104 VA. L. REV. 1283 (2018). 
294. Roberts, supra note 61, at 623. 
295. See supra note 290. 
296. See Clarke, supra note 279, at 103, 119 nn.115-16 and accompanying text (describing the phe-
nomenon of courts refusing to consider discrimination claims from individuals who are not 
members of protected classes where the alleged discrimination derived from their wrongly 
perceived membership in such classes). 
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egy might simply be to limit employer access to information that does not per-
tain to employment. Recall that once employment has begun, the ADA does not 
permit medical examinations or disability-related inquiries unless they are job-
related and consistent with business necessity. Likewise, some states prohibit 
monitoring or retaliating against employees’ lawful conduct away from work.
297
 
A privacy law could forbid employers from seeking out information about their 
employees that is neither relevant nor necessary for the business. 
Another possible strategy for protecting employee privacy would be to limit 
employer access to sources of potentially sensitive data, such as social media ac-
tivity, internet queries, and ﬁtness-tracking devices. A statute could then target 
any employer surveillance unrelated to work as a general matter.
298
 Some states 
already have laws that stop employers from accessing employees’ social media 
proﬁles.
299
 Of course, the line between regulating the type of information and 
regulating access to its source can at times collapse. GINA, for example, prevents 
employers from obtaining a type of data—genetic information—but deﬁnes that 
type of data in part by referring to a source—genetic tests. These distinctions are 
not perfect. Instead, they are examples of possible strategies for approaching the 
issue of employee privacy. 
4. Counterarguments and Qualiﬁcations 
GINA offers a promising template for employment laws of the future. Yet it 
is not without its shortcomings. Here we respond to potential criticisms of 
adopting GINA-like protections to protect against employer prying. 
a. Beneﬁts of Disclosure 
The ﬁrst critique is that both employers and employees could possibly ben-
eﬁt from the information that these protections would shield. Information about 
protected classes like race, religion, and disability is what allow employers to en-
 
297. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 96(k), 98.6 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5 
(West 2015); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/5 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.938 (West 
2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313 (West 2017); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.333 (Lex-
isNexis 2012); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d (McKinney 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 95-28.2 
(West 2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.321 (West 2018). 
298. For such a proposal, see Ajunwa et al., supra note 77, at 774-75. 
299. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124 (Supp. 2017); CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (West Supp. 2018); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 8-2-127 (West Supp. 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-6 (West. Supp. 
2018). 
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gage in positive differential treatment like affirmative action and accommoda-
tion. In the context of genetic information, Mark Rothstein has argued for the 
importance of recognizing genetic difference.
300
 GINA itself acknowledges, 
through its many exceptions, that employees can beneﬁt from sharing their ge-
netic data with employers for the purposes of wellness programs, occupational 
monitoring, and family medical leave. Both authors of this Feature have sepa-
rately touted the potential beneﬁts of recognizing genetic variation in the work-
place. We have each argued in favor of the voluntary disclosure of genetic infor-
mation for the purposes of accommodation and genetic diversity.
301
 Too robust 
of a privacy protection could, therefore, undermine the central goals of antidis-
crimination legislation. 
Worker surveillance more generally could also have meaningful beneﬁts. 
Employers could use sensitive information like social media and browser histo-
ries to ensure a safer, more productive workplace. Monitoring employees or 
screening applicants could allow employers to identify toxic behavior, such as 
racial animus or sexual harassment, early on. One potential justiﬁcation for 
worker surveillance in high-risk jobs is that it may save lives. Computers can 
enlist visual scanning technology to ensure that workers are wearing the appro-
priate safety equipment before allowing them access to dangerous areas.
302
 Cam-
eras on the factory ﬂoor can observe employees in order to quickly identify 
risks.
303
 Invasions of employee privacy could, perhaps counterintuitively, im-
prove the lives of workers. 
While we acknowledge the validity of these critiques, we maintain that GINA 
offers a useful foundation for future lawmaking. GINA outlaws even rational 
discrimination. Nowhere is this clearer than in Title I, where GINA prohibits 
health-insurer access to and use of even actuarially sound genetic information.
304
 





300. See Mark A. Rothstein, supra note 272 (arguing for an equitable legal regime in which genetic 
differences are recognized rather than ignored). 
301. See Areheart, supra note 28; Roberts, supra note 61. 
302. See There Will Be Little Privacy, supra note 1. 
303. Id. 
304. GINA prohibits requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information. GINA § 202(b). It 
does not provide an exception for actuarial fairness. 
305. For a pre-GINA discussion of rational versus irrational genetic discrimination, see Mark A. 
Rothstein & Mary R. Anderlik, What Is Genetic Discrimination and How Can It Be Prevented?, 
3 GENETICS MED. 354 (2001), which differentiates between social and actuarial deﬁnitions of 
genetic discrimination. 
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Of course, some might argue that when a decision maker bases her choice on 
rational deliberation and accurate information, it is not in fact “discrimination” 
at all. But antidiscrimination law rejects such a narrow deﬁnition of what it 
means to discriminate. Statistical discrimination, where people make “rational 
statistical inferences about average differences among . . . groups,” is illegal un-
der most federal employment discrimination laws as intentional discrimina-
tion.
306
 Perhaps the best example of an antidiscrimination law that rejects ra-
tional discrimination is the ADA, which requires an employer to provide 
reasonable accommodations at its own expense for qualiﬁed individuals with 
disabilities.
307
 Further, hiring employees with disabilities may have accompany-
ing costs, making it sometimes economically rational—but illegal—to screen out 
applicants based on disability. Discrimination laws were never intended to max-
imize employer wealth or merely constrain employers to rational decision-mak-
ing. Law has important social functions beyond securing rights or deterring cer-
tain behaviors.
308
 In this light, at least some of GINA’s value is expressive.
309
 It 
communicates that basing decisions on even accurate genetic risk is socially un-
acceptable. 
Permitting even rational genetic discrimination is socially problematic. To 
begin, accurate genetic data merely conveys predictions, not certainties. Thus, a 
person with high genetic risk may never develop the accompanying condition. 
Allowing discrimination based on genetic data could penalize people for some-
thing that may never actually happen. But beyond efficiency concerns, wide-
spread genetic discrimination could produce stigma and, by consequence, a ge-
netic underclass.
310
 Forming a genetic underclass would violate several 
important social norms and values, including humanity (by denying a person’s 
inherent value), democracy (by creating largely arbitrary class distinctions), im-
 
306. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. 
L. REV. 817, 842-43 (1991). 
307. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2018) (noting the term “discriminate against a qualiﬁed individual 
with a disability” includes an unwillingness to make reasonable accommodations); see also id. 
§ 12112(a) (prohibiting such discrimination). 
308. See Areheart, supra note 271, at 1104-08 (“[L]aws do more than secure material rights and 
deter certain behaviors.
 
Rather, they reﬂect social values and send messages to the public 
about both what society should value and how the relevant subject should be valued.”). 
309. Cf. Alex C. Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, Expressive Law and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1061 (2016) (exploring the expressive effects of the ADA). 
310. Roberts, supra note 61, at 631-32. 
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mutability (by punishing people for something outside their control), and pri-
vacy (by leading to the disclosure of intimate information).
311
 Safeguarding in-
dividuals from genetic discrimination and, in so doing, preventing a genetic un-
derclass are important aims of the law. 
As written, GINA strikes a reasonable balance between antidiscrimination 
and efficiency. Through its exceptions, the statute acknowledges that some 
amount of employer access to genetic information is appropriate when an em-
ployee consents to the disclosure and the subsequent use of the information of-
fers the employee some kind of beneﬁt. We might then add additional provisions 
to the statute that would allow employees to voluntarily disclose their genetic 
information for purposes of accommodation and diversity.
312
 
Future laws based on GINA could also include these kinds of prudent excep-
tions. A law that prohibits requesting information about race, national origin, 
religion, gender, or disability must permit employees to share that information 
voluntarily for the purposes of diversity initiatives, accommodation requests, 
and leave applications. With respect to workplace monitoring, any GINA-like 
protection would require that employees consent, something already required 
by the state and federal anti-eavesdropping laws described above.
313
 Voluntari-
ness is essential to obtaining consent. Courts interpreting the law should scruti-
nize policies that make data gathering a condition of employment and other pos-
sibly coercive tactics. In short, lawmakers must carefully craft future employee-
privacy laws to strike the proper balance between secrecy and disclosure, and 
GINA offers some—albeit imperfect—guidance. As well, courts should interpret 
GINA and future privacy laws with these competing objectives in mind. 
b. Traditional Antidiscrimination Classes 
Another possible criticism of adding GINA-like protections for previously 
recognized antidiscrimination classes is that those categories are often not pri-
vate to begin with. Privacy can only preempt discrimination for invisible attrib-
utes. Not only are protected classes like race, gender, and disability often visible, 
but people interact with them in a way that gives them the weight to help deﬁne 
one’s social reality.
314
 People may be uninterested in, or unable to keep secret, 
statuses like race, gender, and disability.
315
 Yet GINA-like privacy protections 
 
311. Id. at 611-17. 
312. See Areheart, supra note 28; Roberts, supra note 61. 
313. See supra Section III.A.2.a. 
314. Roberts, supra note 28, at 2143. 
315. Id. 
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may still have uses in antidiscrimination law, including for traditional antidis-
crimination classes. People can be racially ambiguous, have hidden disabilities, 
not look their age, or identify with a gender that does not correspond to the sex 
denoted on their birth certiﬁcates.
316
 In each of these situations, allowing em-
ployees to maintain some measure of control over their personal information 
could thwart subsequent discrimination. Furthermore, expanding protections 
for traditional antidiscrimination classes could have expressive value by demon-
strating respect with regard to how people construct their identities. 
c. Nature of Big Data 
Critics might also ask whether GINA-like protections would succeed where 
ADA-like protections might fail, particularly with respect to big data. GINA is 
superior to the ADA in preempting the disclosure of medical information in 
three material respects. First, it bans all acquisitions of statutorily covered ge-
netic information, including purchases from third parties, while the ADA con-
tains no such prohibition. The ADA only stops employers from obtaining infor-
mation that pertains to disability through medical examinations or disability-
related inquiries. Purchasing medical information from a third-party source may 
violate the ADA’s spirit but not its face. Second, the ADA expressly allows em-
ployers to obtain information about disability after an offer is on the table. This 
provision means that an employer could, postoffer, condition employment on 
medical disclosures. GINA’s blanket prohibition on obtaining the protected in-
formation from any source at any point in the employment relationship makes 
that law a better prototype for workplace privacy legislation. 
Third, the ADA fails to offer adequate protection in a world of big data in 
part because employers may no longer require medical examinations or disabil-
ity-related inquires to learn what they want to know. If employers do not need 
to rely on genetic data to get access to the information they desire, GINA’s pro-
tections could well suffer from the same deﬁciencies. Big-data analysis can take 
seemingly innocuous information and use it to deduce highly intimate details 
about a person’s life. In the Huntington’s example discussed above, GINA took 
family medical history off the table, making it harder for the employer to deduce 
why the employee was seeing a neurologist. In that context, GINA could effec-
tively combat employer snooping. But imagine that an employer had no access 
to health-related information at all. If Hitachi can use physical movement to 
measure happiness and apps can use “word choice in text messages, the speed of 
 
316. Id. at 2143-47. 
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your speech, and [phone] usage patterns” to assess mental health,
317
 it seems 
plausible that an employer could use those same technologies to detect neuro-
logical decline in its early stages, perhaps even before the individual secures a 
diagnosis or learns of the condition. In such an example, genetic data is not at 
stake, but the scenario raises the same kinds of concerns. Will big data simply 
render GINA-like laws obsolete as well? 
The solution here lies in creating broad protections for potentially sensitive 
information. GINA’s narrow protected status—not its prohibition on request-
ing, requiring, or purchasing—is where the statute may fall short with respect to 
big data. We therefore maintain that GINA’s privacy provisions, complete with 
exceptions to strike the proper balance, offer meaningful guidance to lawmakers. 
As suggested above, courts should interpret genetic information broadly and 
legislators should consider amending the statute to expand its coverage. A move 
away from antidiscrimination classes to protect sensitive information of all 
stripes would be most beneﬁcial to employees. 
d. A Practical Limitation 
GINA in its current form might suffer from at least one practical limitation. 
Rothstein points out that GINA’s privacy provisions are nearly impossible to re-
spect. At present, technology lacks the capability to redact genetic information 
quickly and efficiently from medical records. As a result, employers may inad-
vertently receive genetic information as part of postoffer, ADA-compliant dis-
closures.
318
 Inadvertent acquisition is, as explained above, not actionable. Thus, 
Rothstein asserts that as long as the ADA allows the postoffer release of compre-
hensive medical records, GINA’s prohibition on obtaining genetic information 
will have little practical value.
319
 This ﬂaw is more of a shortcoming of technol-
ogy than of the underlying law. One possible way to solve this issue is to subject 
postoffer medical requests under the ADA to greater scrutiny. We will need to 
 




318. See Rothstein, supra note 30, at 177 (“Effective protection of genetic information in the em-
ployment setting requires a ban on employer requests for comprehensive records at the post-
offer stage; the research, development, and adoption of health information technology to fa-
cilitate the disclosure of only job-related health information; and the legal requirement to 
limit the scope of disclosures to job-related information.”). 
319. Id. at 174-76. 
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develop better software and other tools to allow custodians of health data to re-
dact covered information simply and quickly.
320
 Prohibitions on requesting, re-
quiring, or purchasing private information are still valuable, and having those 
laws in place could encourage innovations that will eventually lead to better com-
pliance. 
C. Implications 
Having outlined GINA’s potential as a blueprint for future lawmaking, we 
now take a deeper dive into the theoretical and practical implications of offering 
GINA-like protections for employee privacy. One thing that made GINA a path-
breaking statute is its combination of a novel privacy protection with traditional 
antidiscrimination protections in the spirit of Title VII and the ADA.
321
 We begin 
with the relationship between antidiscrimination and privacy. We then demon-
strate how GINA’s bimodal framework offers superior protections to previous 
antidiscrimination statutes. 
1. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Privacy Harms 
Privacy and antidiscrimination are two separate but related areas of law. 
GINA’s privacy protections serve two important goals. First, they protect em-
ployees from intrusions into their private lives. Second, they safeguard employ-
ees from discrimination. We can understand both objectives in privacy terms. 
There are at least two kinds of privacy harms: intrinsic and extrinsic.
322
 In-
trinsic privacy harms violate privacy as an independent moral value. Disclosure 
creates intimacy. Privacy has independent moral value because it allows us to 
deﬁne our relationships through what we keep secret and what we disclose. 
Some scholars have even argued that having control over what is known about 
the self is the very basis of civilized society.
323
 With respect to intrinsic privacy 
harms, the detriment is the invasion itself, regardless of whether the intruder 
actually acts on that information. 
 
320. Companies already market products designed to help redact protected health information 
from medical records. See, e.g., Automated Data Redaction Software, EXTRACT SYSTEMS (2018), 
https://www.extractsystems.com/automated-data-redaction-software [https://perma.cc
/Y3GF-5XMC]. 
321. See Roberts, supra note 28, at 2101. 
322. Id. at 2113. 
323. ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, at xiii (1995) (“Although 
we live in a world of noisy self-confession, privacy allows us to keep certain facts to ourselves 
if we so choose. The right to privacy, it seems, is what makes us civilized.”). 
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Consider the devious defecator case. Rather than resulting in an adverse em-
ployment action, the privacy invasion actually exonerated the employees. Em-
ployment discrimination law is clear that being teased alone is not a harm that 
provides a sufficient basis for recovery.
324
 What then was the harm in requiring 
the plaintiffs to undergo genetic testing—a harm that jurors valued at $2.2 mil-
lion dollars? The answer appears to be a transgression of the employees’ genetic 
privacy. Big data threatens to exacerbate the potential for these kinds of intru-
sions, as employees may feel violated when their employers learn information 
that the employees would have preferred to keep secret.
325
 Thus, one beneﬁt of 
GINA-like protections is to uphold privacy in the workplace as an important in-
dependent moral value. 
Discrimination based on previously unknown information can be considered 
an extrinsic privacy harm. Extrinsic privacy harms are the wrongs that ﬂow from 
invasions. Privacy has instrumental value: it allows us to make certain choices 
free from the scrutiny of others. When a person uncovers a secret and acts on 
that new information, an extrinsic privacy harm occurs. An example would be if 
an employer uses big data to deduce that one of its employees is trying to get 
pregnant and then chooses not to promote her based on that acquired 
knowledge. Not only does she experience the independent harm associated with 
the invasion (the intrinsic privacy harm), she also experiences a subsequent ad-
verse employment action (the extrinsic privacy harm). However, if the employer 
never learns she is pregnant, it cannot use that information to her detriment. In 
certain cases, then, protecting privacy can prevent discrimination. 
Traditionally, antidiscrimination laws prohibit employers from taking ad-
verse employment actions on the basis of protected classes. Insofar as they pro-
tect privacy, they almost exclusively cover extrinsic privacy harms.
326
 In many 
states, then, it is legal for employers to question their employees, even if those 
inquiries could open the door for subsequent discrimination.
327
 An employer 
 
324. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (acknowledging that 
antidiscrimination laws are not civility codes for the American workplace and observing that 
such laws do not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment—just harassment that happens 
pursuant to a protected class); Hunt v. City of Markham, 219 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“The idea behind requiring proof of an adverse employment action is simply that a statute 
which forbids employment discrimination is not intended to reach every bigoted act or ges-
ture that a worker might encounter in the workplace.”). 
325. There Will Be Little Privacy, supra note 1 (“As more companies rely on outside ﬁrms to collect 
and crunch employee information, privacy concerns will increase, and employees may feel 
violated if they do not think they have given their consent to sharing their data.”). 
326. Of course, the ADA’s medical inquiry provisions are one exception to this generalization. 
327. See Jessica L. Roberts, Rethinking Employment Discrimination Harms, 91 IND. L.J. 393, 441 
(2016) (explaining that only half of the states prohibit employers from asking about protected 
status). 
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might obtain information about an employee’s race, ethnicity, national origin, 
religion, age, or gender and then act on that information, either consciously or 
subconsciously. Absent meaningful privacy protections, employees could ﬁnd 
themselves victimized twice, once from the unwanted invasion and again from 
the discriminatory act. GINA, however, safeguards against both kinds of privacy 
violations. Any future employment protection based on GINA would likewise 
have the beneﬁt of simultaneously protecting privacy and preventing subsequent 
discrimination, giving employees the ability to recover for both kinds of privacy 
harms. 
2. Antisubordination 
Protecting people’s privacy in data would likewise prevent them from suffer-
ing adverse employment actions based on that data. Employment discrimination 
claims are notoriously hard to prove,
328
 making it arguably easier to prevent an 
employer from obtaining sensitive information than to prevent an employer 
from acting upon it. Robust employee-privacy legislation could therefore have 
the added beneﬁt of reducing opportunities to discriminate. 
Preventing employers from prying into their employees’ private lives could 
have especially important implications for antisubordination. As discussed at 
length, one area of interest to employers is health. Using big data to pry into 
medical history could disparately impact several groups, including women try-
ing to conceive, people with disabilities who have existing or past health condi-
tions (including invisible disabilities), racial and ethnic groups that may be at 
greater risk of certain diseases, and trans individuals who may be seeking or have 
sought gender reassignment unbeknownst to their employers. As a society, we 
may be more likely to label a group as “risky” if that group faces stigma.
329
 Ro-
bust employee-privacy laws could protect those people from potential discrimi-
nation. Moreover, a privacy-based approach bypasses some of the pitfalls of its 
antidiscrimination cousin. By not relying on protected class, it avoids identity 
politics in a time of especially inﬂammatory debate. It also avoids the problem 
of protected class gatekeeping, which incorrectly focuses courts’ attention on 





328. See generally Clermont & Schwab, supra note 288; Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Dis-
crimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001) (demonstrating that employment 
discrimination cases are unusually difficult to win). 
329. See Valarie K. Blake, Ensuring an Underclass: Stigma Theory Applied to Insurance 46 (un-
published manuscript) (on ﬁle with authors). 
330. See Clarke, supra note 279, at 104-06. 
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conclusion 
Congress passed GINA as a solution to a very speciﬁc problem: public anxi-
ety surrounding medical genetic testing. While the statute’s limited scope, nar-
row protected status, and privacy provisions have led commentators to dismiss 
the law as truncated, ineffective, and even unnecessary, GINA’s peculiarities 
make sense when understood in light of its original purpose. However, at 
GINA’s ten-year anniversary, it is unclear whether GINA has had any impact on 
the public’s willingness to take genetic tests. Given this reality, it may be tempt-
ing to dismiss GINA as a failure. 
At ﬁrst blush, our original research in Part II may appear to conﬁrm the view 
that GINA has been a disappointment. However, a closer reading of the cases 
from GINA’s ﬁrst decade reveals that the statute has been an understated suc-
cess. Despite being tangential to its central goal of preventing discrimination in 
health insurance, its protections of employee privacy have been of serious, albeit 
unexpected, value. Reﬂection on the ﬁrst ten years of GINA leads to a surprising 
but critical insight: what employees need most is not protection against discrim-
ination based on genetic-test results, but rather safeguards against employer 
prying more generally. 
Privacy protections at work are more important now than ever. Through data 
mining, employers have vast access to information about their employees’ pri-
vate lives. In a world of big data, GINA offers a robust and unexpected safeguard 
against snooping by employers. The law prevents employers from obtaining in-
formation about a protected status and regulates access to data that employers 
could mine. GINA’s protections could then be a model to better protect privacy 
on the job. 
Technology could soon render other antidiscrimination statutes obsolete. 
Existing laws like the PDA and the ADA do nothing to stop employers from us-
ing big data to learn about their employees’ reproductive lives and risks of disa-
bility. GINA’s value, by contrast, is appreciating. It has the potential to achieve 
far more than what Congress intended. The law demonstrates an effective way 
of structuring much-needed protections for employee privacy in light of the big-
data revolution. Far from being ineffective or useless, GINA may actually serve 
as a model for the employment laws of the future. 
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appendix:  facts,  claims,  and bases for resolution in 
federal cases with plausible gina claims 
By plausible, we mean only that the facts pled could conceivably support a 
claim under GINA or the plaintiff at least attempted to make an argument about 
how genetic discrimination was at issue. These orders pertain to forty-eight 
unique cases; we selected the order for each case that was most pertinent to the 
GINA claim. 
Abbreviations for Employee’s Posture: Constructive Discharge (CD), De-
nied Reinstatement (DR), Failure to Hire (FH), Failure to Promote (FP), Har-
assment (H), Placed on Leave (PL), Demotion (D), Retaliation (Ret), and Ter-
mination (T). The employee’s posture for some cases was not available in the 
opinions; for such cases, we obtained the information from the complaints on 
the actual dockets. 
Abbreviations for Factual Scenarios: Disability Accommodation (DA), Dis-
closure of Genetic Information (DGI), DNA Test (DNA), Drug Test (DT), Fit-
ness-for-Duty Examination (FDE), Genetic Test (GT), HIV Test or Diagnosis 
(HIV), Mandatory Wellness Program (MWP), Other Disclosure of Medical In-
formation (ODMI), Other Disclosure of Family Medical History (ODFMH), 
Request for Medical Exam or Records (RMER), Request for Family Medical 
History (RFMH), Unemployment (UN), Voluntary Wellness Program (VWP), 
and Workers Compensation (WC). The facts alleged for some cases were not 
fully available in the opinions; for such cases, we obtained the alleged facts from 
the complaints on the actual dockets. 
Abbreviations for Claims: Disclosure of Genetic Information (DGI), Dis-
crimination (Disc), Harassment (H), Retaliation (Ret), Unlawful Request 
(UR), and UWP (Unlawful Wellness Program). 
Abbreviations for Substantive Resolutions: Deﬁnition of Discriminate 
(Disc), Deﬁnition of Employee (EE), Deﬁnition of Employer (ER), Deﬁnition 
of Genetic Information (GI), Deﬁnition of Genetic Test (GT), Unlawful Request 
(UR), and Deﬁnition of Wellness Programs (WP). Only thirty-one cases are 
resolved, in whole or in part, under GINA’s statutory terms, and they are noted 
in this column with an asterisk (*). The other seventeen cases involve a plausible 
GINA claim that (a) was left fully unresolved (U) or (b) involved a procedural 
resolution (PR). 
Abbreviations for Party Prevailing: Defendant (Def), Plaintiff (Pl). 
Under the heading for Substantive Resolution, we have indicated resolutions 
that are only procedural as “PR.” For example, if the defendant sought to dismiss 
the matter for purposes of arbitration, we have marked it as PR. If the matter is 
still pending, and not at all resolved, we have notated these cases as UR. If the 
defendant ﬁled a motion to dismiss and that motion was denied as to the GINA 
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claim, we have noted the decision as UR. In all types of resolutions, we have 
sought to indicate the party prevailing on the GINA claim—even if the decision 
is not resolved under GINA (i.e., substantive) or a complete resolution. Accord-
ingly, under the heading Party Prevailing on GINA Claim, we have sought to 
indicate which party has prevailed thus far. As such, some of these decisions are 
interlocutory in nature. Finally, if neither party prevailed under a substantive 
provision of GINA, we have marked those cases with a dagger symbol (†).  
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